University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications

1995

A Restatement of the Supreme Court's Law of
Religious Freedom: Coherence, Conflict or Chaos?
Carl H. Esbeck
University of Missouri School of Law, esbeckc@missouri.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/facpubs
Part of the First Amendment Commons, and the Religion Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Carl H. Esbeck, A Restatement of the Supreme Court's Law of Religious Freedom: Coherence, Conflict, or Chaos?, 70 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 581 (1995)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository.

A Restatement of the Supreme Court's Law of

Religious Freedom: Coherence, Conflict, or Chaos?
Carl H. Esbeck*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .............................

II.

RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

....

A.
B.
C.

When Government May Not Hinder Religion .........
When Government May Not Help Religion ..........
"Religion" and the First Amendment:
Definition and Application .....................
III. IS A NEW THEORY BASED ON EQUALrIY REPLACING

582
592
596
601
610

AN OLDER REGIME ROOTED IN SEPARATIONISM AND

COERCION? ...............................
IV. DIFFERING VISIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT'S PURPOSE
REGARDING RELIGION ........................

614

Protecting the Religiously Informed Conscience ........

622
622

B.

Protecting the Society from Religion ...............

625

C.
D.
E.

Protecting Religion from the State ................
Protecting Religious Choicefrom State Influence ......
ProtectingReligious Institutions as Counterweights to
State Power and as Sources of Utimate Meaning .....

635
638

A.

V. CONCLUSION

..............................

APPENDIX
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

641
644

....

646

* Isabelle Wade and Paul C. Lyda Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia. B.S., Iowa State University, 1971; J.D., Cornell University, 1974. Sincere thanks to
Dean M. Kelley, Thomas C. Berg, Charles J. Emmerich, and Michael J. Woodruff for
their helpful suggestions on an earlier draft of parts of this article.

HeinOnline -- 70 Notre Dame L. Rev. 581 1994-1995

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

I.

[Vol. 70:3

INTRODUCTION

Religious freedom as guaranteed in the First Amendment
makes religious pluralism more likely, while pluralism makes the
maintenance of religious freedom as a fundamental civil right
more necessary. It seems there is a limit, however, to the expansion of America's religious pluralism that, when exceeded, shatters
cultural consensus thus rendering impossible the political and civil
discourse necessary to sustain democratic institutions.' This follows
because pluralism promises freedom but exacts a price in civic
disunity and moral confusion. The question thereby resolves itself
into just how a religiously diverse people are to live together,
despite their deepest differences, while sharing in a national purpose that binds citizens together.
The problem of religious diversity and the maintenance of a
common civil polity is an old one. Following the Thirty Years'

1 For reasons of legitimation, democratic societies require a sense of cohesion-a
strong common commitment to the nation and its well-being. The commitment must
come from the people, their beliefs and values; it cannot be created er nihilo. Scholars
of sociology, religious studies, and political philosophy are saying that the "culture wars"
are a sign that the nation is testing the outer boundaries of the American experiment in
self-government. They propose that a pluralism with no center, so to speak, cannot nurture the civic behaviors necessary to democracy. See, e.g., Francis Canavan, The Pluralist
Game, LAWx& CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1981, at 23; OS GUINNESS, THE AMERICAN HOUR:
A TIME OF RECKONING AND THE ONCE AND FUTURE ROLE OF FAITH (1993) (America is in
a crisis of cultural authority because her beliefs, traditions, and ideals-civic as well as
religious-are losing their power to shape the private and public lives of citizens); James
Hitchcock, Church, State, and Moral Values: The Limits of American Pluralism, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1981, at 3; JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, BEFORE THE SHOOTING
BEGINS: SEARCHING FOR DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA'S CULTURE WARS (1994); JAMES DAVISON
HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA (1991). John Courtney

Murray states the problem well:
For a century and a half the United States has displayed to the world the fact
that political unity and stability are not necessarily dependent on the common
sharing of one religious faith.
The reach of this demonstration is, of course, limited. Granted that the
unity of the commonwealth can be achieved in the absence of a consensus with
regard to the theological truths that govern the total life and destiny of man, it
does not follow that this necessary civic unity can endure in the absence of a
consensus more narrow in its scope, operative on the level of political life, with
regard to the rational truths and moral precepts that govern the structure of the
constitutional state, specify the substance of the commonwealth, and determine
the ends of public policy.
JOHN C. MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN

PROPOSITION 80 (1964). If democratic institutions cannot be sustained, human rights, including religious freedom, will also be lost.
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War, the Peace of Westphalia (1648) resolved the matter simply, if
crudely, by adopting the principle cujos regio, ejus religio (whose is
the country, his is the religion). In a modem age where rationalism and individualism are enthroned, America's jural arrangements
for dealing with religious dissent and the ordering of church-state
relations have become far more refined and attentive to human
rights. But the arrangements have seemingly lost all simplicity,
and, if the sheer number of critics is to be weighed in the balance, the United States Supreme Court's decisions have departed
from all consistency. Almost no one, not even a majority of the
Justices on the Court,2 is pleased with the current state of First
Amendment case law concerning religion. The Supreme Court
continues distancing itself from Establishment Clause doctrine first
stated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, by not referring to-or noting only
in passing-the three-part test.' Why is this so? And why have
religious dissent and church-state relations, once thought to be
matters long settled, now erupted into a many-sided debate?5
Most threats to fundamental rights protected by the U.S. Con-

2 Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2498-2500
(1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2149 (1993) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 2149-50 (Scalia, J., joined by
Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107-13
(1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The majority opinion in Grumet was written by Justice
Souter and joined by, inter alia, Justice Ginsberg. Justice Souter did not utilize or rely
upon the test stated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), to reach his conclusion
that the Establishment Clause was violated. Grumet 114 S. Ct. at 2487-94. Only Justice
Blackmun continued to defend the Lemon test, id. at 2494-95, and he has since retired.
3 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The Court stated the test as follows:
First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally,
the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.
Id. at 612-13 (citations and internal quotation omitted).
4 See Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2487-93 (majority does not rely on or utilize Lemon test
to reach conclusion that Establishment Clause was violated); Lamb's Chape4 113 S. Ct. at
2148 (majority mentions Lemon only in passing); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist.,
113 S. Ct. 2462 (1992)(majority makes no reference to Lemon). Although a majority of
the Justices on the Court have expressed discontent with the Lemon test, the Court has
not expressly overruled the test, apparently because there is no consensus on a replacement.
5 The criticism is not confined to cases decided under the Establishment Clause.
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990), which abandoned strict scrutiny review in Free Exercise Clause cases, Congress
and the President showed their disapproval by enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994 Supp.).'RFRA provides a statutory compelling interest test for analysis of religious freedom claims.
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stitution arise as bipolar conflicts (an individual versus a law or
acts by an official under color of law) and, hence, are resolved by
straightforward balancing tests. Take, for example, a claim that the
government is suppressing someone's freedom of speech. With the
exception of a few discrete types of speech (e.g., child pornography, criminal solicitation, perjury), an individual's expression, most
notably political speech, is protected from content-based regulation
unless governmental authorities come forth with the most compelling of justifications. Because courts also regard corporations and
other associations as "persons" for free-speech purposes, the legal
framework for determining an association's expressional rights
utilizes the identical balancing test applicable to individuals.6

First Amendment religious freedom is not nearly so two-dimensional. In addition to sorting out the problem of the individual who wants-free of governmental limitations-to do something
or to refrain from doing something out of religious scruples, there
exists a second task. This task is the proper ordering of the relationship between two centers of authority: church and state.' Religious freedom, then, unlike any other rights analysis under the

6 This is not to oversimplify the Free Speech Clause, for the Supreme Court has
developed numerous rules that apply depending on context and other factors. The point
here is that ultimately the constitutional law on freedom of speech reduces to a single
question: How far can the government go in limiting private speech? In contrast, the
constitutional law on freedom of religion requires answering two questions and sometimes
harmonizing the answers: How far can the government go in limiting religious belief or
practice? And, how far can the government go in advancing religion? Moreover, asking
these two questions assumes a juridical definition of religion, a matter that in a given
case may be disputed.
7 Religious organizations possess an institutional character distinct from other voluntary organizations and, therefore, hold unique institutional rights, not merely the sum
of the derivative rights of an organization's members. The rationale is that religious organizations have a sphere in which they may operate unhindered in accordance with their
understanding of their own divine origin and mission. This unique character is acknowledged by the necessity under the Establishment Clause of keeping organized religion and the offices of state in the proper relationship. See JOHN C. BENNETT, CHRISTIANS
AND THE STATE 195-99 (1958); MARK D. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 5-15 (1965); Paul G.
Kauper, Church Autonomy and the First Amendment: The Presbyterian Church Case, in CHURCH
AND STATE: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 67 (Philip B. Kurland ed.,
1975); Herbert Richardson, Civil Religion in Theological Perspective, in AMERICAN CML RELIGION 161, 178-80 (Russell E. Richey & Donald G. Jones eds., 1974); LAWRENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTrruTIONAL LAW § 14-11, at 1236 (2d ed. 1988); MIER DAN-COHEN,
RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND

ORGANIZATIONS:

A LEGAL THEORY FOR BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY 177

(1986) (church autonomy identified as an example of "neo-feudalist influence on constitutional thinking"); Mark D. Howe, Political Theory and the Nature of Liberty, 67 HARV. L.
REV. 91, 92-95 (1953) (identifying church autonomy as the "philosophy of political pluralism" that gives religious bodies some of the "prerogatives of sovereignty").
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Constitution, requires patrolling the boundaries between two powerful institutions, church and state, much like a separation of
powers provision.8 Moreover, this latter task entails a dual role:
preventing government from improperly promoting religion9 and
preventing government from interfering in the precincts of organized religion.'"
Altogether, the First Amendment's regard for religious freedom must account for two relationships and, as to each, answer
two questions. The two relationships are: (i) the interaction of the
state with individual persons, who may profess one of a bewildering number of religious faiths or none at all; and (ii) the interaction of the state with religious organizations, the latter being either the loci of collective worship (church, synagogue, mosque) or
auxiliary ministries of considerable variety (schools, soup kitchens,
adoption agencies, shelters for battered women, mission societies,
world hunger and refugee relief agencies). Concerning each of
these relationships, First Amendment analysis begins by asking two
questions: Is the state acting to hinder religion on the one hand,
or is the state acting to help religion on the other? Not every instance where persons or religious organizations are hindered by
the state is unconstitutional. Likewise, not every instance where

8

Professor John H. Garvey states:

[The Establishment Clause] speaks about relations between institutions, not beThe clause thus regulates affairs between individuals and government ....
tween government and the churches, much as the original Constitution regulates
affairs between government and the states.
John H. Garvey, A Comment on Church and State in Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century America, 7 J.L. & RELIGION 275, 278 (1989).
9 See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1963) ("Although these two [religion]
clauses may in certain instances overlap, they forbid two quite different kinds of governmental encroachment upon religious freedom. The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free
Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion
and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether
those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or not."); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 430 (1961)(notwithstanding that injury was economic rather than
religious, plaintiffs have standing to bring Establishment Clause challenge to Sunday closing law because history "demonstrate[s] that the establishment of a religion was equally
feared because of its tendencies to political tyranny and subversion of civil authority").
10 See, e.g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 642 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in
the judgment) ("Our decisions under the Establishment Clause prevent government from
supporting or involving itself in religion or from becoming drawn into ecclesiastical disputes."); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 730 (1871) ("The structure of our government has, for the preservation of civil liberty, rescued the temporal institutions from
religious interference. On the other hand, it has secured religious liberty from the invasion of the civil authority.").
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persons or religious organizations are helped by the state is unconstitutional. Therefore, ascertaining whether the state is hindering or helping religion does not itself determine whether there is
a constitutional violation. Rather, the hinder/help inquiry is like a
sorting gate which .gets one steered in the direction of the line of
case-law authority that most closely deals with the specific matter
in question.
As the foregoing overview suggests, the juridical task of laying
down principled rules regarding religious freedom and the First
Amendment is more multidimensional than other areas of rights
analysis. The Supreme Court's cases illustrate the diverse ways in
which issues of religious freedom arise. For example, students of
the Jehovah's Witnesses faith have a right to opt out of a statemandated Pledge of Allegiance recited before the nation's flag because for them such an act is paramount to the worship of a graven image.1 In this first type of case, the state cannot demand
performance of an activity that one's faith prohibits. In a second
line of cases, it is held that the state cannot prohibit an activity
that one's faith commands. For example, a Baptist has a right to
respond to what he believes is a call to the pastorate, yet not
thereby suffer disqualification from holding public office. 2 In a
converse situation, an atheist cannot be denied public office for
refusing to take an oath professing belief in God.13 In this third
type of case, the state cannot compel a choice between making a
profession of faith or suffering loss of a civic advantage. The First
Amendment is not just for those professing a creed, but also for
those who subscribe to none. The claims by the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Baptist pastor illustrate unconstitutional hindrances to
religion, whereas the oath of office was an unconstitutional helping
of religion.
Since not every governmental hindrance or help to religion
violates the First Amendment, the difficulty is in knowing when
the state's actions have crossed the line into unconstitutional territory. For example, a religious pacifist has no constitutional right to
withhold payment of taxes even though the payments go, inter alia,
for the support of military activity contrary to the tenet of pacifism. 4 Similarly, individuals who believe it violates their religious

11 West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
12 McDanie 435 U.S. 618.
13 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
14 United States v. American Friends Serv. Comm., 419 U.S. 7 (1974) (per curiam);
see United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982).
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freedom to be compelled to pay taxes that, inter alia, support a
church-related college of a religion different from their own are
not thereby excused from paying taxes.15 The religious aspirations
of both pacifists and taxpayers are doubtlessly hindered, yet the
government's laws were found not to have crossed over into territory protected by the free exercise of religion.
In contrast, a state may enact tax deductions for school tuition payments, notwithstanding that the tax break overwhelmingly
favors parochial school parents. 6 Likewise, a state may provide a
traveling evangelist access to a public park for conducting a revival
meeting.' Allowing the access materially helps the spread of-religion, yet it does not violate the First Amendment. Indeed, the
Court has held that granting access to public areas for religious
purposes on a basis equal to that afforded others cannot be constitutionally denied. 8
The foregoing cases all concern individual religionists and
their interaction with either the coercive power of the state or the
dispensing of its largess. A quite different set of issues arises when
religious organizations enter the fray.19 This is because the First

15 Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 689 (1971); see Lee 455 U.S. at 257 (Amish
employer required to pay Social Security tax on Amish employees notwithstanding that
tax violated the religious belief that those within the Amish community are to care for
one another).
16 Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1988).
17 Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290
(1951); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
18 Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993);
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
19 See supra text accompanying notes 7-10. That the role of the First Amendment in
patrolling the boundaries of church and state goes beyond individual religious injury is
most evident in the Court's cases involving standing doctrine and the Establishment
Clause. Normally, an individual asserting a constitutional claim must have suffered a personal, concrete injury that would be remediable by judicial process. The Court has carved
out an exception to this general standing requirement in the case of federal and state
taxpayers raising Establishment Clause challenges to governmental spending programs.
Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 618-20 (1988)(federal taxpayer); Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83 (1968) (federal taxpayer); Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 433
(1952) (allowing state taxpayer challenge of offending law only when "supported by [a]
separate tax or paid for from [a) particular appropriation or that it adds any sum whatever to the cost of conducting the school"). When there is an improper fusing of church
and state such that a government is providing a benefit to religious organizations, individuals do not necessarily suffer a direct, personal harm. Thus, no one has standing to sue
in the traditional sense. Garvey, supra note 8, at 278-79. This has led the Court to make
an exception to standing rules, thereby permitting judicial examination on the merits of
church participation in governmental financial programs. In a taxpayer's claim the real lament is not that he or she has suffered an injury because a few cents in taxes were misHeinOnline -- 70 Notre Dame L. Rev. 587 1994-1995
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Amendment requires an ordering of relations between the institutions of organized religion and the offices of state. In popular
terms, this is expressed as the "wall of separation between church
and state." By contrast, the amendment does not command a
separation of individual believers from their government-an impossibility, unless one is prepared either to cleave in half the human heart or to disenfranchise all religious citizens. Thus, there is
a uniqueness about certain types of state alliances with a church,
as well as interventions by the state into the internal affairs of a
church, that endanger religious freedom.
Once again the Supreme Court's cases are illustrative of the
complications. Government may exempt religious organizations
from paying property taxes,2" as well as from compliance with
legislation barring discrimination in employment." Should a dispute over religious doctrine result in the summary removal of a
cleric from ecclesiastical office, the civil courts will decline to review alleged irregularities concerning procedural due process or
the denial of substantive rights.22 All three of these exemptions
clearly help organized religious bodies by maintaining their operational autonomy. Indeed, in a lawsuit that requires resolving a
dispute over religious doctrine, the longstanding rule is that the
First Amendment would be violated if a court presumed to take
jurisdiction. In contrast to these three cases, government may
regulate religious organizations by imposing minimum wage
laws,23 as well as by assessing a uniform tax on the sale of religious literature by a church.24 Although compliance with the labor law and payment of the tax surely hinders the freedom of
religious organizations by taking their resources that could be used
in other ways, it gave the Court little pause to declare that the
required separation of church and state was not transgressed.

spent. Rather, monetary damages in the form of misspent taxes is a surrogate for injury
to the civic polity resulting from a misbalance of the proper relationship between church
and state. The underlying claim is that the two "powers" of organized religion and the
offices of state must be "separated" as required by the Establishment Clause, and, when
they are not so separated, plaintiff suffers an injury to the correct ordering of these two
powers. The plaintiff is essentially a named representative acting on behalf of the public
interest.
20 Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
21 Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
22 Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); Gonzalez v.
Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1 (1929).
23 Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985).
24 Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990).
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Upon first impression these series of cases appear hard to reconcile.
If the foregoing framework is not complicated enough, like a
canopy suspended over all of this analysis is the problem of defining "religion" for First Amendment purposes. For example, if individuals involved in a church-operated shelter for the homeless
should claim that the shelter's operation is protected by the First
Amendment because it is an exercise of religion, their claim is
plausible and, if sincere, will be acknowledged by the courts as
coming within the definition of "religion." If, however, the government then enacts social welfare legislation establishing several
state-operated shelters for the homeless, is the state now participating in a religious activity? Common sense says "no," yet how can
the identical activity be religious for the individual claimants but
not religious for the state? Or assume that one of the central tenets of a church is that gambling is sin. Church members actively
seek to dissuade people from gambling, work against its legalization, and establish self-help groups for those addicted to gambling.
If the legislature then enacts a state-wide lottery and aggressively
advertises so as to induce sales, is the state actively suppressing
"religion" by throwing its considerable weight against a central tenet of this church? Again, the answer would seem to be "no," but
how is this reconcilable with what is surely known to be religion
for other purposes? Some argue that there are two definitions of
"religion" for purposes of the First Amendment: one for the Establishment Clause and another for the Free Exercise Clause.' Others find this an unsatisfactory hermeneutic, for the term "religion"
appears only once in the text of the amendment.26

25 LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTiTUrIONAL LAW § 14-6, 828 (1st
Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056
TRIBE, supra note 7, § 14-6, at 1186 n.53 (collecting authorities and criticizing
tions proposal).
26 Justice Rutledge, writing about the text of the First Amendment in
Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), observed:

ed. 1978);
(1978); cf.
two definiEverson v.

"Religion" appears only once in the Amendment. But the word governs two prohibitions and governs them alike. It does not have two meanings, one narrow to
forbid "an establishment" and another, much broader, for securing "the free
exercise thereof." "Thereof' brings down "religion" with its entire and exact
content, no more and no less, from the first into the second guaranty, so that
Congress and now the states are as broadly restricted concerning the one as
they are regarding the other.
Id. at 32 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). See Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 210-13 (3d Cir.
1979) (Adams, J., concurring in the result) (rejecting two definitions proposal); TRIBE, supra
HeinOnline -- 70 Notre Dame L. Rev. 589 1994-1995
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There is a logic to the results in the foregoing illustrations,
but it is not always easily grasped. Part II of this article sets about
systematizing and thereby making sense of the Supreme Court's
religion cases. Beginning in 1923, the American Law Institute
undertook a Restatement of the principal subjects of the common
law: contracts, agency, torts, property, trusts, judgments, conflict of
laws, etc. 27 Part II is a draft of a Restatement of the Law of Religious

Freedom as distilled from the Supreme Court's First Amendment
cases.
To pursue such a Restatement may appear ambitious given the
derision presently heaped upon the Court's current Establishment
Clause doctrine originating with Lemon v. Kurtzman.2 ' But the approach of a Restatement of the Law is a far less imposing task
than the one-size-fits-all formula attempted by the three-part Lemon
test.2 9 Such formulaic abstractions attempt to encompass and ex-

plain in a single verbal map all the Court's cases on the proper
relationship among church, state, and persons of faith or none.
Considerable judicial energy is spent "refining" the formula to
achieve the desired result and then reconciling holdings with the
plain meaning of the verbal equation. Observing that "the slide
away from Lemon's unitary approach is well under way," in Kityas
Joel Village School District v. Grumet, ° Justice O'Connor suggested
that what was no longer needed in religious liberty cases was "a
single test, a Grand Unified Theory that would resolve all the
cases that may arise under a particular clause.""1 Rather, Justice
O'Connor called for "a less unitary approach" as offering a more
promising "structure for analysis."3 2 She reasoned that "[i]f each
test covers a narrower and more homogeneous area, the tests may
be more precise and therefore easier to apply."33
The Restatement of the Law of Religious Freedom appearing in Part

note 7, § 14-6, at 1186 n.54 (collecting authorities).
27 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS at vii-xii (1932).
28 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
29 This is not only true of the Lemon test, but applies as well to Justice Kennedy's
coercion test, County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659 (1989)(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Justice O'Connor's endorsement
test, Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring); and Chief
Justice Rehnquist's nonpreferentialism test, Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113
(1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
30 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2500 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
31 Id. at 2498-99.
32 id at 2500.
33 Id.
HeinOnline -- 70 Notre Dame L. Rev. 590 1994-1995
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II is such an approach. The jural arrangements that deal with
religious freedom are simply too multidimensional for the singleformula approach to succeed. Moreover, the rash of concurring
and dissenting opinions generated by the three-part Lemon test
gives the appearance of greater disagreement among the Justices
than is the actual case. An additional benefit of the Restatement, as
will be seen in Part II, is the realization that there are fewer religious freedom issues actually dividing the Supreme Court than
conventional wisdom has previously assumed.
Part III of this article demonstrates that the Restatement can
quickly be put to good use, testing scholarly theories and alarmist
predictions concerning where the Court is supposedly headed (or
wrongheaded) with the First Amendment. One author claims, as
explored in Part III of this article, that the Establishment Clause
cases can best be understood as a collision of two competing theories of church-state relations.' The argumentation behind this
claim is that the apparent incoherence in Establishment Clause
cases is indicative of a trend, in which the Court is now midstream, of replacing an older regime focused on separationismwith
a new regime based on equality. Moreover, the claim argues that
the unexpected adoption of a new Free Exercise Clause test in the
peyote case, Employment Division v. Smith, 5 similarly can be understood as replacing an older theory centered on prohibiting coercion
of conscience with a theory that also is based on equality. Using the
Restatement of the Law of Religious Freedom, Part III of this article
demonstrates that this claim succeeds only by half.36
Part IV of this article explores why the debate concerning
religious freedom swirls around theories rooted in coercion and
separationism on the one hand, and religious choice on the other.
Behind these three concepts are differing presuppositions which
animate the forces and factions in American society that contend
over religious freedom. These theories-really competing visions-differ as to whai is the fundamental purpose of the First
Amendment. Is it to protect individuals from coercion,37 to protect the society from religion," to protect religion from the

34 See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
35 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (upholding employment dismissals of drug counselors who, as
a sacrament in Native American Church, ingested the illegal drug of peyote).
36 See infra text accompanying notes 179-82.
37 See infra Part IVA.
38 See infra Part W.B.
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state,39 to protect freedom of religious choice," or to protect
mediating institutions41 (of which the church is one important
such institution) that serve both as a counterweight to the power
of the modem state and as communities of ultimate meaning?
References to these differing visions are found in Supreme Court
cases and scholarly literature. With the aid of the Restatement, these
five visions are explored in Part IV, with brief references to some
of the Justices' opinions, as well as to books and articles that extol
them.
II.

RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

There is near universal agreement on the starting point: the
overarching purpose of the First Amendment is to secure religious
freedom, for persons of faith or none, and for religious organizations. However, this point of departure has not advanced the major conflicts very far toward an amicable resolution because of the
sharp dispute over the meaning of religious freedom.
As with all freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, the
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses protect "negative" rights.
That is, the Religion Clauses tell the government what it may not
do.42 This is the most straightforward sense in which it is said
that government cannot improperly hindey3 religion.

39 See infra Part IV.C.
40 See infra Part IV.D.
41 See infra Part IV.E.
42 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 412 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("[T]he Free
Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the government cannot do to the individual,
not in terms of what the individual can exact from the government.").
A closely parallel principle is that the Religion Clauses do not confer a right upon
citizens to demand that government make certain choices in the conduct of its internal
affairs or the uses to which it puts government property so that citizens can better exercise their religion. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439
(1988)(holding that the decision to build forest road on federal lands is not subject to
free exercise claims by Native Americans); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986)(holding
that the government's internal use of a Social Security number is not amenable to free
exercise claim by Abenaki Native American).
43 If government action is divided into its elemental parts, it is made up of imposing and lifting burdens, as well as extending and withholding benefits. Analytically, a
claim that government is improperly hindering religion can arise in one of four scenarios:
1. Government imposes a burden on religion, when the burden is not imposed.
on others similarly situated.
2. Government imposes a burden on religion, when the burden is imposed on
others similarly situated.
3. Government withholds a benefit from religion, when the benefit is extended
to others similarly situated.
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As with all "negative" rights found in the Bill of Rights, the
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses do not act as a limitation
on what private individuals or religious organizations may do."
Nevertheless, because of the unique task of the Religion Clauses
in ordering two centers of power,45 government is restrained
from certain involvements with religion and religious organizations
when the government's actions unlawfully promote religion. It is
in this latter sense-unusual in constitutional rights analysis-that
it is said that government cannot improperly help46 religion.47

4. Government discriminates among religions by imposing a burden on some
religions but not others, or by extending a benefit to some religions but not
others.
"Burden" is defined infta note 90, and "benefit" is defined infra note 89. As will be seen
below in RESTATEMENT I, the Supreme Court has addressed each of these scenarios.
Concerning point four (discrimination among religions), the Court has addressed
this scenario, not as a matter of hinderingsome religions, but as a matter of helping other
religions. Presumably the Court's rationale is that to discriminate against some religions
has the potential of helping other religions. But that is only a potential consequence.
Discrimination against one religion may not result in helping other religions. Thus, it is
more logical to regard scenario four as a problem of improperly hindering religion. The
Supreme Court has not taken this approach. Accordingly, the RESTATEMENT follows the
Court's lead and takes up the matter of discrimination among religions as a matter of
helping religion. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IL.BA [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT].
44 Richard J. Neuhaus writes:
The religion clause of the First Amendment is entirely a check upon government, not a check upon religion. Even if a particular religion were to agitate
successfully to have itself officially established, it is the government that would
have to do the establishing. And that is what the government is forbidden to
do. As wrongheaded as it would be, religions are perfectly free to agitate to
have themselves established, for that too is part of religious freedom. What is
prohibited by the First Amendment is the . . . [use] of government power in
giving in to such agitations. And the only reason the government is not free to
establish a religion is that it would violate religious freedom. The religion clause
is not then, as some claim, a check upon both government and religion, nor is
it a provision in which two clauses are to be "balanced" against one another.
The religion clause is not to protect the state from the church but to protect
the church from the state. Similarly, in press-state relations, the First Amendment is not to protect the state from the press but to protect the press from
the state. The "great object" of the Bill of Rights, UJames] Madison most explicitly said when introducing his draft to the House [of Representatives], was to
"limit and qualify the powers of Government."
Richard J. Neuhaus, Establishment Is Not The Issue, in RELIGION & SOC'Y REP., June 1987,
at 1, 3.
45 See supra text accompanying notes 7-10.
46 As stated supra note 43, if government action is divided into its elemental parts,
it is made up of imposing and lifting burdens, as well as extending and withholding
benefits. Analytically, a claim that government is improperly helping religion can arise in
one of four scenarios:
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To begin at the most elementary level, a cardinal rule of
construction is that the text of the First Amendment has to be
assumed internally coherent. Accordingly, the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses must be construed as never in contradiction. Because the clauses cannot be in opposition to one another,
when the clauses do overlap in their purview it must be because
the underlying principles of both clauses are violated. A second
canon of construction is to avoid redundancy, thus each clause
must have its own arena of independent operation. Neither clause
is merely instrumental to the other's role, nor is either subordinate to the other in the event of apparent tension between the
clauses. The Religion Clauses are best envisioned as a draft team
pulling together in the direction of full freedom for religion.
Religious practice frequently takes the form of oral speech,
displays of symbols, written publications, group meetings, and appeals to officials. The First Amendment's expressional clauses

1. Government extends a benefit to religion, when the benefit is withheld from
others similarly situated.
2. Government extends a benefit to religion, when the benefit is extended to
others similarly situated.
3. Government refrains from imposing a burden on religion, when the burden is
imposed on others similarly situated.
4. Government discriminates among religions by imposing a burden on some
religions but not others, or by extending a benefit to some religions but not
others.
"Burden" is defined infra note 90, and "benefit" is defined infra note 89. As will be
shown below in RESTATEMENT II, the Supreme Court has addressed each of these scenarios.
47 There is a simplistic appeal to envisioning the Free Exercise Clause as addressing
all cases where it is claimed that the state is improperly hindering religion, and likewise
invoking the Establishment Clause as dealing with all cases where the state is said to be
improperly helping religion. Although such an organizing principle does in fact fit many
situations, it has not always been followed by the Court. Thus, there are circumstances
where the Establishment Clause has been applied to prevent religion from being hindered by government. See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (discriminating
against a new religious movement violates the Establishment Clause); McDaniel v. Paty,
435 U.S. 618, 636-42 (1978)(Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (state law barring
clerics from public office violates both Religion Clauses); see also infra text accompanying
notes 202-214. Further, the fact that the Establishment Clause addresses both the hindering and helping of religion is evident from elements two and three of the Lemon test, see
supra note 3, and Justice O'Connor's no-endorsement test as originally stated in Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (focusing on whether law's
purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion, or whether the practice under review in
fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval). This occurs because the Establishment Clause-not just the Free Exercise Clause--serves religious freedom, the agreedupon starting point. And this common goal can mean that either clause may, on occasion, deal with claims of improper hindering of religion.
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(freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom to assemble,
and freedom to petition) also protect religion when it takes the
form of communication or assemblage. With few exceptions, the
Supreme Court strikes down content-based regulations directed at
speech of political, artistic, or educational content. The same high
protection is accorded speech with religious content.4 8 By subsuming the amendment's protection for religious expression under the
Free Speech Clause, the Court has given religious expression a
broader base, one predicated on the notion that the content of
everyone's speech is equal before the law. The Free Speech Clause
is a more secure base because the rule that government may make
no content-based distinctions in speech is well settled in the courts
and more widely accepted by the populace than are principles of
religious freedom. However, when the state itself is the speaker,
the aim of the First Amendment turns one hundred and eighty
degrees. No longer is the concern over suppression of private
speech and, thereby, the improper hindering of religion; the concern is with the government's own speech and the possible improper helping of religion.49
Although not mentioned in the text of the First Amendment,
freedom of thought has long been understood to be necessarily
embraced within the ambit of the amendment's protection. Complete freedom of thought is necessary to the exercise of free
speech. The Court has sensibly included religious belief as part of
this freedom of thought."0
Religious freedom cannot be absolute, of course, but is necessarily attenuated by society's interest in protecting health, safety,
and other collective concerns of the highest order.5 The oft-used
illustration is that the First Amendment cannot shield one who
has committed an act of human sacrifice from being prosecuted
for murder.
To summarize the foregoing framework, First Amendment
religious freedom cases are organized along several significant
distinctions: (i) cases involving religious speech versus those not
involving speech; (ii) cases involving private speech versus those
involving government speech; (iii) cases involving individuals ver-

48
49
50
51

See
See
See
See

infra text
infra text
infra text
infra text

accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying

notes 60-62.
notes 78-83.
note 59.
note 70.
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sus those involving religious organizations;52 and, (iv) cases involving the imposition of governmental burdens versus those involving
the conferring of governmental benefits. 3 Only "state action," of
course, can violate the amendment. 4
At this juncture, it bears emphasizing that the Restatement is
intended to be descriptive only, not prescriptive as to how things
ought to be.55 The latter would take a separate paper, one adopting a more critical approach. Nor is the Restatement meant to be a
once-for-all-time codification concerning the issues that surround
the First Amendment's clauses on religion. The Restatement is a
mere snapshot of the present. Later interpretations by the Court
will doubtless evolve with our shared understandings of the relationship between the Constitution and the society it is to serve.
With the foregoing distinctions and caveats in hand, a survey
of the cases reveals that the Supreme Court has applied the following rules concerning religious freedom and the First Amendment:
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 56

1.

When Government May Not Hinder Religion
A. The Free Speech ClauseS7 protects the expression of
an individual or religious organization from governmental

52 See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
53 See supra notes 43 and 46. "Benefit" is defined infra note 89, and "burden" is
defined infra note 90.
54 Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987), states:
A law is not unconstitutional simply because it allows churches to advance religion, which is their very purpose. For a law to have forbidden "effects" under
Lemon, it must be fair to say that the government itself has advanced religion
through its own activities and influence.
lId at 337 (emphasis in original). See supra note 44.
55 This thought, however, raises a related point. Some commentators frequently
criticize the Supreme Court's religion cases for inconsistency, which, if true, would leave
the Court quite vulnerable. But many of these critics are really at odds with the Court's
substantive understanding of religious freedom. The RESTATEMENT should help here as
well. Once commentators appreciate that large blocks of the Court's case law are not in
hopeless disarray, their criticism will have to be targeted where it will be most constructive, namely on the merits of the Court's jurisprudence.
56 The RESTATEMENT, without the encumbering footnotes, is reproduced in the Appendix.
57 As used here, "Free Speech Clause" is shorthand for the four expressional clauses
in the First Amendment (speech, press, assembly, and petition), as well as freedom of
thought which the Court has inferred from the expressional clauses. Moreover, freedom
of speech necessarily entails the right not to speak.
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597

restrictions9 as follows:
1. Individuals and religious organizations cannot by
word or symbolic act be forced to profess a belief
contrary to their religion. 59
2. An individual or a religious organization is entitled to
protection of religious expression to the same extent
as nonreligious expression, such as political, artistic,
or educational speech.' The Free Exercise Clause

58 "Governmental restrictions" include both the written law (statutes, regulations,
ordinances), as well as acts under color of law by governmental officials and employees.
59 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1977) (sustaining a claim by Jehovah's
Witness that state statute requiring motor vehicle license plates bear the motto "Live Free
or Die" violates freedom of thought guiarantee which includes the "right to refrain from
speaking at all"); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642
(1943) (compulsory flag salute and pledge of allegiance "invades the sphere of intellect
and spirit"); see United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944)("Freedom of thought,
which includes freedom of religious belief, is basic in a society of free men."); see infra
note 222. Although the holdings in Wooley and Barnette were based primarily on the Free
Speech Clause, logically the same result would be reached under the Free Exercise
Clause.
There are two additional cases instructive on the rule stated in the text. In
Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946), the Court held that Congress had not
required as a condition of naturalization the taking of an oath to hear arms. Plaintiff was
a religious pacifist. The holding was based on statutory construction. Although not a First
Amendment case, the dictum reveals that the Court focused on religious freedom in
reaching its result. First Unitarian Church v. County of L.A., 357 U.S. 545 (1958), is an
example of a victory for a religious organization. The Court struck down a loyalty oath
required to obtain a municipal property tax exemption. The Court, however, based its
holding on procedural due process, expressly stating that the case did not necessitate
reaching the religious freedom claim raised under the First Amendment.
The rule stated in the text does not, without more, prevent government from exposing individuals or organizations to ideas that offend or contradict their religion.
Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 1066 (1988)(exposing public school students to religiously offensive literature -1
not protected by free exercise); Cornwell v. State Bd. of Educ., 428 F.2d 471 (4th Cir.),
ceat. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970)(teaching sex education in public school does not violate
either Free Exercise or Establishment Clauses); Rosenberg v. Board of Educ., 92 N.Y.S.2d
344 (1949)(Jewish parents unsuccessful in attempt to exclude from public school curriculum Shakespeare's "The Merchant of Venice" and Dickens' "Oliver Twist" because of
characterization of Jews). A state taking into account the religious sensibilities of its citizens may be a virtue, but it is not a First Amendment right.
60 Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951)(meeting permit); Saa v. New York, 334
U.S. 558 (1948) (sound amplification); Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946) (literature distribution); Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944)(license tax); Martin v. City
of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (handbills); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105
(1943)(license tax); Jones v. Opelika (II), 319 U.S. 103 (1943) (handbills); Jamison v.
Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943) (handbills); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943)(door-todoor solicitation); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)(breach of the peace);
Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (handbills); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303
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grants no more than equal rights to religious expression, 6 and the Free Speech Clause requires no
less.62
Governmental expression is treated differently than
speech by a private individual or a religious
organization,63 for the focus shifts to one of government
helping religion."
B. The Free Exercise Clause protects an individual's religious belief or practice' from governmental restrictions
as follows:
1. Government cannot place an individual in the position of having to prove the truth of his or her religious beliefs, but sincerity is required when invoking
protection.6
2. Government cannot enforce a restriction that pur-

U.S. 444 (1938) (literature distribution).
61 Heffron v. International Soc'y of Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 652-53
(1981) (solicitation on state fair grounds); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 179
(1943) (Jackson, J., concurring in the result) (religious literature sold by itinerant preachers).
62 Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141
(1993) (viewpoint discrimination); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981)(content discrimination); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951)(same); see Board of Educ. v.
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (upholding Equal Access Act). Although the holdings were
based on the Free Speech Clause, logically the same result would be reached under the
Free Exercise Clause.
63 Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250 (plurality opinion) ("[Tihere is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and
private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect."); see Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271 n.9 (Establishment Clause requires distinguishing between religious speech by government and nonreligious speech by government).
64 See RESTATEMENT II.A.
65 Religion consists of both belief and practice, the latter arising out of the underlying belief. An individual's freedom to believe or think anything he or she wants is
absolute, at least until one tries to act on that belief. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
402-03 (1963). But religious acts are protected also, as the First Amendment confirms by
use of the action word "exercise," denoting practice or observance.
In the rhetoric of early cases, the Supreme Court appeared to distinguish sharply
between belief and action. See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342-43 (1890)(Mormon
polygamy); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878)(Mormon polygamy). The
distinction appeared in the Court's early modern cases as well. See, e.g., Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603-04 (1961) (plurality opinion). This was interpreted as a signal
that the Court intended to give half-hearted protection to religious practices. But the
Court's recent cases make only rare mention of the belief/action distinction, suggesting
that the Court has quietly acknowledged its error in making too much of it.
66 United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944)(prosecution for mail fraud); id.
at 94-95 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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posefully6 discriminates against religion, religious
practice, or against an individual because of his or
her religion.6 However, a restriction's discriminatory
effect is not, without more, unconstitutional.69 Even
in the face of purposeful discrimination, government
may proceed to enforce a restriction upon proof that
it furthers a compelling state interest ,that cannot be
achieved by means less restrictive to the religious
67 "Purposefully" means the legislature's statutory objective as apparent from the text
and its authoritative interpretation or application. Inquiry into "purpose" may go beyond
the mere text or "face" of a statute. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of
Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2227 (1993); see Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S.
Ct. 2481, 2489 (1994).
Legislative purpose should not be confused with legislative motive. A judicial inquiry
may not go into the motive of each legislator supporting a legislative bill. A motive analysis would have implications not only for the denial of religious freedom, McDaniel v.
Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 641 (1978)(Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment), but also for
violating separation of powers, United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968). See
Mergens, 496 U.S. at 249 (plurality opinion) ("Even if some legislators were motivated by a
conviction that religious speech in particular was valuable and worthy of protection, that
alone would not invalidate the Act, because what is relevant is the legislative purpose of
the statute, not the possibly religious motives of the legislators who enacted the law.");
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 615-16 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38, 74-75 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); Clayton ex teL
Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376, 380 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1081
(1990)("We simply do not believe elected officials are required to check at the door
whatever religious background (or lack of it) they carry with them before they act on
rules that are otherwise unobjectionable under the" EstablishmentCClause.); STEPHEN L.
CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRVAlZE RELI-

GIOUS DEVOTION 111-13 (1993).
68 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 113 S. Ct. at 2226; McDanie4 435 U.S. 618; see
Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 385-92 (1990)(distinguishing and explaining Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944), and
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943)); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 n.23
(1982). See also Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277 (1866), where an individual was arrested for performing his duties as a Catholic priest contrary to the state constitution.
Following the Civil War, the constitution was amended to require the taking of an oath
denying certain past acts having to do with the war. Failure to take the oath disqualified
an individual from assuming numerous offices, including clerical. The Court struck down
the provision as an ex post facto law. The issue of religious freedom was not discussed.
When the government's discrimination is purposeful, no substantial burden on religion need be shown by the religious claimant. Brown v. Borough of Mahaffey, 35 F.3d
846, 849-50 (3d Cir. 1994) (refusing to apply substantial burden requirement "to non-neutral government actions [because such] would make petty harassment of religious institutions . . . immune from the protection of the First Amendment").
69 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). By enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.CA §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (West Supp. 1994), Congress
has sought to go beyond the rule stated in the text by granting more protection to the
free exercise of religion. Statutory protection for religious freedom that goes beyond the
First Amendment is not unusual. See RESTATEMENT II.C.5.
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practice."
C. The Religion Clauses' protect a religious belief or practice of a religious organization from governmental restrictions as follows:
1. A religious organization is protected from restrictions
that invade its institutional autonomy.7 2 Restrictions
that generate a detailed inquiry into religious doctrine 73 or that entail a civil resolution of a dispute
over doctrine 4 violate an organization's institutional

70 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 n.29 (1983) (eliminating racial
discrimination in schools); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982)(fair and efficient collection of taxes); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 383-86 (1974)(raising and
supporting the armed forces); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461-62
(1971) (same); Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash.
1967), af"d per curiam, 390 U.S. 598 (1968) (administering blood transfusions to children
over religious objections of parents).
The compelling interest test is an assessment of the importance of the law in question being enforced without exceptions for religious claimants. The test is not a balancing of the importance of uniform enforcement of the law against the degree of impact
the law has on the claimant's religious practice. Courts are not competent to weigh the
extent of harm to one's spiritual development nor evaluate the relative merits of differing claims of religious harm. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885-87.
71 Because the Establishment Clause, not just the Free Exercise Clause, protects religious freedom, the Supreme Court is careful to premise church autonomy cases on both
clauses. See cases cited infra note 74. The Establishment Clause, with its role in ordering
relations between organized religion and the offices of state, much like a "wall of separation" that screens out unconstitutional conduct coming from either side of the divide, see
supra notes 7-10, is particularly appropriate in these institutional separation cases.
72 "Institutional autonomy" means there is a sphere within which a religious organization may provide for the definition, development, and transmission of the
organization's beliefs and practices without governmental interference and may freely
select, promote, discipline, and dismiss its clerics, officers, and members. The jurisprudential basis for institutional autonomy is the subject of the authorities cited supra in note 7
and infra Part IV.C.
73 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 604 n.30; Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70
n.6, 272 n.11 (1981); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981); Waz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305-06
(1940)(petty officials not to be given discretion to decide what is a legitimate "religion"
for purposes of issuing solicitation permit); Espinosa v. Rusk, 634 F.2d 477 (10th Cir.
1980), affld mem., 456 U.S. 951 (1982)(striking down ordinance that charged officials with
issuance of a solicitation permit depending upon determination whether collection of
money was for "secular" or "spiritual" purposes).
74 Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976)(civil courts may
not probe into procedures churches used to remove clerics); Maryland & Virginia
Churches v. Sharpsburg Church, 396 U.S. 367 (1970)(in resolving church property disputes, civil courts may not adjudicate questions of church doctrine); Presbyterian Church
v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969)(judicial interference hazards inhibiting the free
development of religious doctrine and implicating secular interests in matters of purely
ecclesiastical concern); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952)(First
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autonomy.
2. Concerning litigation over the ownership of church
property, states have the option of following either
the rule of judicial deference 5 or of neutral principles of law," so long as the prohibitions in Restatement I.C. 1 are followed.
Apart from the prohibitions in Restatement I, the Religion
Clauses are not violated by the regulation or taxation of
religious organizations, so long as similarly situated nonreligious organizations are subject to the same law.7
I1. When Government May Not Help Religion
A. Concerning governmental expression, government may
neither confess inherently religious 78 beliefs 79 nor advo-

Amendment contains "a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an independence
from secular control or manipulation-in short, power to decide for themselves, free
from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of frith and doctrine"); Gonzalez v. Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1 (1929); Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. (15
Wall.) 131 (1872); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871); see Corporation of
Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987) (ability of religious organizations to
define and carry out their missions); id. at 342-43 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (religious organizations need to be able to discriminate in favor of co-religionists as
employees); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 502-04 (1979) (noting "serious First
Amendment question" should teacher/school relationship at parochial schools be regulated by labor board).
75 Bouldin, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131; Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679. The rule of judicial deference is that civil courts are to do no more than determine the highest ecclesiastical tribunal with jurisdiction over the dispute, ascertain the decision of the tribunal,
and defer to its resolution of the dispute.
76 Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
77 Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 384-98 (1990);
Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 305-06 (1985); see Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1989) (plurality opinion). But cf. Saint Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772 (1981)(adopting rule of
statutory construction that assumes Congress intended to exempt all parochial schools
thereby avoiding issue of institutional autonomy); Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490
(same); Rector of Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892)(adopting
rule of statutory construction that assumes Congress intended to exempt churches thereby
avoiding issue of institutional autonomy).
In Swaggar 493 U.S. at 396-98, and Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 20, the Court cautioned against making distinctions between core religious practices (e.g., worship, doctrinal teaching, distributing sacred literature) and those activities by religious organizations
that are more ancillary (e.g., operating a soup kitchen or hospital). In the absence of
legislative guidance, courts should avoid making distinctions that turn on the doctrine of
the religion or church in question, as well as avoid making "centrality" determinations.
See R STATEMENT IlA
78 "Inherently religious" means those intrinsically religious activities of worship and
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cate that individuals profess inherently religious beliefs or
that individuals observe such practices.80 Government
may acknowledge the role of religion in society and
teach about its contributions to, for example, history,
literature, music, and the visual arts.8' But the Establish-

prayer and the propagation or inculcation of the sort of matters that comprise confessional statements or creeds. The term also includes the supernatural claims of churches,
mosques, synagogues, temples, and other houses of worship. These words are not used to
identify buildings, but to describe the confessional community around which a religion
identifies and defines itself, conducts its worship, teaches doctrine, and propagates the
faith to children and adult converts.
The Supreme Court has found that prayer, devotional Bible reading, veneration of
the Ten Commandments, classes in confessional religion, and the biblical story of creation are all inherently religious. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (prayer);
Edwards v. Aguilard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (creationism); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38
(1985)(prayer); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam) (Ten Commandments);
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (creationism); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203 (1963) (prayer and Bible reading); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (prayer); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (teaching religion).
On the other hand, legislation restricting abortion, Sunday closing laws, rules prohibiting interracial marriage, and teenage sexuality counseling are not inherently religious.
See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (teenage counseling); Bob Jones Univ. v.
United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 n.30 (1983) (interracial marriage); Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297 (1980) (abortion restrictions); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Sunday
closing law); Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582
(1961) (Sunday closing law).
79 For examples of cases where government is confessing inherently religious beliefs,
see County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (public display of nativity of Jesus
as the Messiah); Stone, 449 U.S. 39 (posting of Ten Commandments in school classrooms). But cf Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (upholding nativity of Jesus situated among other holiday displays).
80 For examples of cases where government is advocating that individuals profess
inherently religious beliefs or that they observe such practices, see Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2649
(prayer); Edwards, 482 U.S. 578 (teaching scientific creationism); Wallace, 472 U.S. 38
(encouraging prayer); Epperson, 393 U.S. 97 (prohibiting teaching evolution); Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (prayer and devotional Bible reading); Enge4 370 U.S. 421 (teacher led prayer);
McCollum, 333 U.S. 203 (facilitating the teaching of religion). But cf Marsh v. Chambers,
463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding legislative chaplain and prayer).
Narrow exceptions to the rule stated in the text exist in situations where government has isolated an individual from his or her religious community, such as in the
armed forces or in prison. In these "special environments," government may bring religion to the individual because government is responsible for the individual's inability to
obtain the requisite religious services at his or her own initiative. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at
299 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[H]ostility, not neutrality, would characterize the refusal to
provide chaplains and places of worship for prisoners and soldiers cut off by the State
from all civilian opportunities for public communion . .
").
81 Edwards, 482 U.S. at 606-08 (Powell, J., concurring); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225;
McCollum, 333 U.S. at 235-38 (Jackson, J., concurring). The rule stated in the text accords with Florey v. Sioux Falls School District, 619 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 987 (1980)(allowing public school to include Christmas music as part of balanced
program of secular and sacred selections representative of the culture and season).
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ment Clause is violated when the expression places
government's imprimatur on a religion8 or on an inher82 Government's imprimatur must not be placed on a particular religion, confession
of faith, or creed. However, America's governmental institutions have long acknowledged
general theism in such forms as the national motto ("In God We Trust"), the Pledge of
Allegiance ("one nation, under God, indivisible"), and patriotic music ("God Bless America"). To modern rationalists, these are nostalgic references from an age when America
was unabashedly more pious. Although inconsistent with current Establishment Clause
doctrine, in the opinion of modernists official references to God are a blend of patriotism and civil religion, de minimis in their harm to nontheists. Thus, it is prudent to

overlook the inconsistency. See

LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION

AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 184-85 (1986).
The idea that our governmental institutions are in a sense "under God" was present
at America's founding, and this political philosophy is reflected in many of its constituting documents and the words of early statesmen. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 91-106
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (numerous references to America's religious origins); Rector of
Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 465-72 (1892)(same). As Justice
Douglas observed concerning America in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952),
"We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being."
Notwithstanding 200 years of secularization, this idea persists into the present. Empirical studies show that a majority of Americans still believe that "God is the moral
guiding force of American democracy." See Jeffery L. Sheler, Spiritual America, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REp., Apr. 4, 1994, at 48, 51 (55% answered in the affirmative).
This is a First Amendment issue of great sensitivity, and the courts have, in uneasy
fashion, postponed the working out of the implications of America's historic public philosophy. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692-93 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (city's display including
nativity scene does not violate the Establishment Clause); Schemnp, 374 U.S. at 303-04
(Brennan, J., concurring)("In God We Trust" and "one nation under God" are constitutional); Zorach, 343 U.S. at 312-13 (dicta approving of "appeals to the Almighty in the
messages of the Chief Executive; the proclamations making Thanksgiving Day a holiday,
'so help me God' in our courtroom oaths" and "the supplication with which the Court
opens each session: 'God save the United States and this Honorable Court"); Sherman v.
Community Consol. Sch. Dist., 980 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1992), cet. denied, 113 S. CL 2439
(1993) (recitation of Pledge of Allegiance at public schools, including phrase "one nation,
under God," not unconstitutional where students free not to participate); O'Hair v.
Murray, 588 F.2d 1144 (5th Cir. 1979)(rejecting claim that national motto "In God We
Trust" and its required use is unconstitutional); Aronow v. United States, 432 F.2d 242
(9th Cir. 1970)("In God We Trust" not violative of First Amendment).
It is helpful here to distinguish between a principle of law and a political postulate
concerning what is necessary to sustain American democracy. Hence, there is no contradiction between the institutional separation of church and state as a juridical principle
and a cultural consensus that republican government must ultimately "be legitimized by
making it answerable to transcendent moral law." A. JAMES REICHLEY, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 112-13, 348 (1985). Through religion "human rights are rooted in the
moral worth with which a loving Creator has endowed each human soul." I& at 348. So
long as theistic religion remains the chief source and teacher of moral authority in
America, government's mere acknowledgement of that fact is not, without more, inconsistent with the Establishment Clause. But government should refrain from endorsing any
confessional statement concerning the Deity. Thus, this minimalist god-in-common is purposely left ambiguous in any official sense.
Dr. Os Guinness, in his sociological critique of America and her faiths, put the matter succinctly:
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ently religious belief or practice.
B.

Concerning governmental action that is not expressional,
the Free Speech and Establishment Clauses are violated
as follows:
1. Government cannot penalize "blasphemy," the "sacrilegious," or other activity that does no more than
speak ill of a religion.

Converging developments ...
reveal with ever sharper clarity the audacious
gamble that underlies the American experiment. The American republic simultaneously relies on ultimate beliefs (for otherwise it has no right to the [human]
rights by which it thrives), yet rejects any fixed, final, or official formulation of
them (for here the First Amendment is the clearest, most original, and most
constructive). The republic .will therefore always remain the "undecided experiment" in freedom, a gravity-defying gamble that stands or falls on the dynamism
and endurance of its "unofficial" faiths.
Os GUINNESS, THE AMERICAN HouR: A TIME OF RECKONING AND THE ONCE AND FUTURE

ROLE OF FAITH 18-19 (1993). To the extent that official, general references to God supports theism, as opposed to more particularistic references to Christianity or Judaism, very
few Americans object. Indeed, one could safely predict that there would be a general
outcry---even vigorous resistance-if the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional governmental references to God. It would not be prudent for the federal courts, wielding the
Establishment Clause, to influence the contemporary debate over America's public philosophy one way or the other. Thus, the courts have not declared unconstitutional official
references to theistic belief or unspecific references to God as undergirding America's
political institutions.
83 Elected and other high public officials may, without violating the First Amendment, be specific about their religious faith when they speak. In America, pronouncements by elected officials that interweave patriotism and religion have a long and venerable tradition. Familiar examples are presidential speeches that call upon God's providence as the nation fices some new challenge or adventure or that conclude with "may
God bless America," celebration of Thanksgiving as a day for collective acknowledgement
of God's hand in the harvest and other good favor, and the practice started by George
Washington of taking the presidential oath of office with the added "so help me God."
See Robert N. Bellah, Civil Religion in America, 96 DAEDALUS 1 (1967).
It is expected that a reasonable member of an audience, upon hearing the President speak of religious belief or practice, understands that the President does so out of
a reflection of his own faith and not as one explicating official policy or prescribing
rules of citizen conduct. Citizens neither want nor expect the President to hide his religious faith when in public, nor do they want or expect him to disregard any solace he
may find in his religion. See Sheler, supra note 82, at 48, 51 (Although 53% of registered
voters polled thought "[Wie have to keep church and state completely separate," 78% of
the same group thought "[t]he [P]resident should be a moral and spiritual leader," and
84% thought that "our government would be better if policies were more directed by
moral values."). Moreover, citizens suffer no coercion and only de minimis pressure to
adopt the President's religious beliefs or practices, merely upon hearing him reference
religion. Finally, citizens must be expected to understand that elected public officials have
a right to free exercise of their own religious faith, including the right to openly speak
about it.
84 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 505-06 (1952)(striking down law
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4.

Government cannot compel an individual, upon pain
of material penalty, inconvenience, or loss of public
benefit or advantage, to profess a religious beliefo
or to observe an inherently religious practice. 6
Government cannot delegate civil authority to a religious organization. 7
Government cannot purposefully discriminate among
religions,88 nor utilize classifications based on
denominational or sectarian affiliation to extend benefits' or to impose burdens'."

permitting censorship of films that are "sacrilegious"); see Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S.
97, 107 n.15 (1968) (dictum concerning purposes of blasphemy statutes); cf. infra note 106
and accompanying text.
85 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 496 (1961)(overturning belief in God as a condition of holding public office); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) ("Freedom of thought, which includes freedom of religious belief, is basic in a society of free
men."). This is an area where the purview of the Free Speech and the Establishment
Clauses overlap. Additionally, the requirement in U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3, provides that
there may be no religious test for federal office.
86 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 451 (1961) (Sunday closing law is not inherently religious and thus compelling its observance does not violate Establishment Clause);
Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 598 (1961)(same);
Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, 366 U.S. 617, 624 (1961)(same).
87 Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982); see Kiryas Joel Village Sch.
Dist. v. Grumet 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2488-90 (1994) (plurality opinion).
88 Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67
(1953); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
When a law of secular purpose has a disparate effect among religious organizations,
the Establishment Clause is not violated. Larson, 456 U.S. at 246 n.23; Bob Jones Univ. v.
United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 n.30 (discrimination among religions was not purposeful,
but the unintended effect of the Internal Revenue Service's facially neutral, secular regulation); Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 695-96 (1989).
89 "Benefit" means affirmative financial assistance in the nature of a subsidy, grant,
entitlement, loan, or insurance, as well as a tax credit or deduction.
A tax exemption, such as that upheld for religious organizations in Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), is to be distinguished from tax credits and deductions.
Only credits and deductions are within the definition of a governmental benefit. A tax
exemption is government's election to "leave religion where it found it," and thus not
the extension of a benefit. See RESTATEMENT II.C.1. On the other hand, for First Amendment purposes a tax credit or deduction is little different from a direct grant or a cash
payment. The idea that exemptions, credits, and deductions for organizations should all
be regarded alike as "tax expenditures," while useful in other areas of legal policy, does
not make sense in dealing with issues that arise under the Religion Clauses. Boris I.
Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizationsfrom Federal Income
Taxation, 85 YALE L. J. 299, 345 (1976); Boris I. Bittker, Churches, Taxes and the Constitution, 78 YALE L. J. 1285 (1969); DEAN M. KELLEY, WHY CHURCHES SHOULD NOT PAY TAXES 11-13, 47-57 (1977).
90 "Burden" means a regulation, tax, or criminal prohibition.
91 Grumet 114 S. Ct. at 2491-93; Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971); see
HeinOnline -- 70 Notre Dame L. Rev. 605 1994-1995

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

5.

6.

7.
8.

[Vol. 70:3

Government cannot utilize classifications that single
out a religious practice (as opposed to language
inclusive of a general category of religious observances) thereby favoring that particular practice.92
Government cannot regulate the private business
sector so as to purposefully and unreasonably favor
religious observance over competing secular interests.93
Government cannot confer a benefit on religion if the
benefit is not available to others similarly situated.'
Government cannot confer a benefit directly on religious organizations where the benefit, facially or as
applied, affords an opportunity for the transmission
of inherently religious beliefs or practices; this is so
even though the benefit may be available to others

Larson, 456 U.S. at 246 n.23 (distinguishing and explaining Gillette). The rationale, in
part, is that the Court wants to avoid making membership in a denomination more attractive. If the rule stated in the text was not the law, then merely holding religious
membership would result in the availability of a civil advantage. For example, it would
violate the rule stated in the text if Congress were to confer conscientious objector draft
status "on all Quakers," for that may cause conversions to Quakerism. On the other
hand, the government purposefully may utilize classifications based on a person's religious
belief or practice-as distinct from denomination-to lift civil burdens from those individuals. For example, Congress may confer conscientious objector draft status "on religious
pacifists who oppose war in any form." Gillette 401 U.S. at 447; see Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at
2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
92 Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (striking down state law
favoring Sabbath observance); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136,
145 n.l (1987) (explaining and distinguishing Thornton); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock,
489 U.S. 1, 18 n.8 (1989) (plurality opinion). For example, if Saturday as a day of rest is
legislatively required to be accommodated by employers, all religious practices (including
all religious days of rest) must be required to be accommodated. If a Kosher diet is required to be accommodated by commercial airlines, then all religious practices (including
all religious dietary requirements) must be accommodated. If a student absence from
public school is excused for Good Friday, then so must all religious practices (including
absences for all religious holy days). Cf Gillette, 401 U.S. at 450 (Congress permitted to
accommodate "all war" pacifists but not "just war" inductees because to broaden the
exemption invites increased church-state entanglements and would render almost impossible the fair and uniform administration of selective service system).
93 Estate of Thornton, 472 U.S. 703; Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 145 n.11 (explaining and
distinguishing Thornton); see Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986); Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
94 Committee for Pub. Educ. of Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973) (striking down state aid to education program that benefits only religious schools);
see Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394, 396 n.6, 398-99 (1983) (explaining and distinguishing Nyquist); Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. CL 2481, 2491-93
(1994) (legislation favoring one particular religious sect is unconstitutional).
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C.

similarly situated. 95
Governmental actions not prohibited in Restatement i,
II.A, and II.B are left to the judgment of legislatures and
public officials. Accordingly, without violating the Es-

tablishment Clause government may enforce a law as
follows:
1.

Government may refrain from imposing a burden on
religion, even though the burden is imposed on oth-

ers similarly situated.97

95 All of the Court's cases concern aid to primary and secondary parochial schools.
For cases disallowing all or some direct aid, see Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S.
373 (1985); New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125 (1977); Wolman v. Walter,
433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756; Levitt
v. Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). For cases allowing some direct aid, see Committee for
Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980) (reimbursement for cost
of state-mandated tests and reporting); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236
(1968) (secular textbooks).
The Court has received considerable criticism-even ridicule-for the close distinctions it has made between permissible and impermissible aid in parochial school cases.
However, for present purposes these differences are best seen as disputes over whether
the Court placed matters in the right category, not whether appropriate categories exist
that prohibit some direct benefits to parochial schools but permit other forms of direct
aid. Compare the rule stated in the text with RESTATEMENT II.C.2.
96 Between the full sweep of the Free Exercise Clause and the full reach of the
Establishment Clause, there remains breathing space for the discretionary judgments of
the various state and federal legislatures. For example, a legislature may exempt a religious practice from a burden imposed by neutral legislation. See Employment Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990); RESTATEMENT II.C.I. This serves representative democracy, but there is a down side. Legislative exemptions are hard to secure, especially for
minority or unpopular religions. And, of course, the very idea of a Bill of Rights is
countermajoritarian. However, the Establishment Clause protects minority and unpopular
religions in these situations much like the Equal Protection Clause safeguards racial and
ethnic minorities. Accordingly, legislative exemptions cannot be granted to politically
powerful religions without being extended as well to minority religions. See RESTATEMENT
II.B.4 to II.B.5.
97 Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987), is the leading
case. Amos upheld a religious discrimination exemption for religious organizations in federal civil rights legislation. "[I]t is a permissible legislative purpose to alleviate significant
governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry
out their missions." Id. at 335. See also Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437
(1971)(religious exemption from military draft for those who oppose all war does not
violate Establishment Clause); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding property tax exemption for religious organizations); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 495
(1952) (upholding release time program for students to attend religious exercises off public school grounds); Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) (upholding, inter alia,
military service exemptions for clergy and theology students). But see Texas Monthly, Inc.
v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (plurality opinion) (disallowing sales tax exemption when
available only to those who purchase religious literature).
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Government may directly confer a benefit on religious organizations if the benefit is available to others similarly situated and if the object of the benefit,
facially or as applied, does not afford an opportunity
for the transmission of inherently religious beliefs or
practices.98

The rationale for the rule stated in the text is twofold. First, to establish a religion
connotes that a government must have taken some affirmative action to seek to achieve
the prohibited result. Conversely, for government to passively "leave religion where it
found it" logically cannot be "a law respecting an establishment of religion." See Douglas
Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations
and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1373, 1416 (1981) ("The state does
not support or establish religion by leaving it alone."). Second, reducing civil-religious
tensions and minimizing church-state interaction enhance the separation sought by the
Establishment Clause.
For government to relieve religious claimants of burdens on private religious choice
no more unconstitutionally favors religion than does the Free Exercise Clause unconstitutionally favor religion. As Justice White observed in Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333,
372 (1970) (dissenting opinion), the Free Exercise Clause is itself a law that by its express
terms exempts religion from certain civic burdens. Any law-such as the Free Exercise
Clause-that purposefully exempts religion from a civil duty cannot possibly violate the
Establishment Clause, for then the latter clause would cancel out the former. Therefore,
an appropriate legislative purpose may include allowing individuals and religious organizations to make religious choices unimpeded by governmental burdens placed on others.
Amos is explicit in making the salient distinction between benefits, see RESTATEMENT
II.B.7, and burdens, see the rule stated in the text. The special extension of a benefit
raises a more serious Establishment Clause claim than does the lifting of a burden. The
distinction is between government passively allowing an individual to freely make a religious choice, on the one hand, and government actively promoting or fostering an
individual's religious choice by the enticement of a benefit, on the other. Stated plainly,
government is passive when it is "not getting in the way of" religious choice (e.g., Amos,
Wak, and Zorach), whereas government is active when it is "paying for" religious choice
(e.g., Nyquist).
Amos also demonstrates that for a government to "refrain from imposing a burden"
is logically no different from "lifting a burden" imposed in the past. In Amos, a burden
first imposed in 1964 was lifted in 1972. See also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 83
(1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
98 Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988), the leading case, upheld a federal program providing grants for teenage sexuality counseling, including counseling done by
religious centers. See also Roemer v. Maryland Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736
(1976)(church-affiliated college); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973)(same); Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971)(same); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899)(churchaffiliated hospital); cf. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 782 n.38 (distinguishing the religious-only funding program struck down in Nyquist from cases involving public assistance generally made
available without regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian or public-nonpublic nature of the
institutions benefitted).
Compare the rule stated in the text with Restatement II.B.8. The rationale for the
stated rule is that the social service initiatives of the modern welfare state may desire to
treat religious organizations in a nondiscriminatory manner to avoid influencing the religious choices of individuals through governmental financial incentives. For example, if an
individual wants to obtain drug rehabilitation counseling at his or her church, rather
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4.

Government may confer a benefit on individuals,
who exercise personal choice in the use of their
benefit at similarly situated institutions, whether public, private nonsectarian, or religious, even if the
benefit indirectly advances religion.99
Government
may
purposefully
benefit
only
governmental agencies, thereby excluding similarly
situated private organizations, whether nonsectarian
or religious.1" However, a law that benefits all similarly situated groups, public and private, but purposefully excludes religious organizations, is prima

than a secular agency, he or she ought to have that choice. For that choice to be possible, church-affiliated programs must be eligible for governmental funding.
99 Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993) (providing special
education services to Catholic student not prohibited by Establishment Clause); Witters v.
Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (upholding a state vocational rehabilitation grant to a disabled student who chose to use the grant for training
as cleric); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 399-400 (1983) (upholding a state income tax
deduction for parents paying school tuition); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947) (upholding state law providing reimbursement to parents for expense of transporting children by bus to school, including parochial schools); cf. Durham v. McLeod, 192
S.E.2d 202 (S.C. 1972), dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 413 U.S. 902
(1973) (dismissed the same day that the Court decided Nyquist which struck down religious only aid to private schools). In Durham, the state court upheld a student loan program wherein students could attend the college of their choice, religious or secular.
Similarly, the Court in Nyquist implied that educational assistance provisions, such as the
G.I. Bill, do not violate the Establishment Clause even when some students choose to
attend church-affiliated colleges. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 782 n.38; cf. Sloan v. Lemon, 413
U.S. 825, 833-35 (1973)(holding unconstitutional state tuition reimbursement plan available to parents of all nonpublic school students).
The rationale of rule stated in the text is twofold. First, the constitutionally salient
cause of any potential indirect benefit to religion is the self-determination of numerous
individuals, not that of the government. Merely enabling private religious choice-where
individuals may freely choose or not choose religion--cannot logically be a governmental
establishment of religion. The government is largely passive as to the relevant choice.
Second, the indirect nature of the aid reduces church-state interaction and oversight, enhancing the institutional separation desired from the perspective of the Establishment
Clause.
Numerous familiar programs illustrate the stated rule: individual income tax deductions for contributions to charitable organizations, including those that are religious; federal aid to students attending their college of choice; the G.I. Bill; federal child care certificates for low income parents enrolling their child in preschool.
100 Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 462 (1973); Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 (dictum).
Accordingly, for government to decide to fund only public schools does not violate the
First Amendment. However, if the government decides to fund all schools except religious schools, then the rule stated in RESTATEMENT I.B.2 is violated. Concerning the
constitutionality of an educational voucher program that excluded religious schools, see
CARTER, supra note 67, at 194, 200.
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facie violative of the Free Exercise Clause. 101
Subject to the prohibitions in Restatement I and II,
government may protect individuals and religious
organizations against discrimination on the basis of
religion in, for example, employment,'02 public accommodations,0 3 housing,' " other property holdings and contracts," 5 the commission of hate
crimes,1' 6 and the exercise of free speech.' 7

"Religion" and the First Amendment: Definition and Application
A. A religious belief or practice need not be "central" to a

101 The rule stated in the text is the logical implication of the rules in RESTATEMENT
I.B.2 and II.B.8. That is, RESTATEMENT I.B.2 prohibits purposeful discrimination against
religion. If applicable, however, compliance with the Establishment Clause rule stated in
RESTATEMENT II.B.8, would be a compelling rationale for excluding religion.
For example, a governmental program of providing tax free bonds to finance capital improvements at institutions of higher education may not exclude church-affiliated
colleges but no others. See RESTATEMENT I.B.2. However, that same program, as applied,
may not be used to sell revenue bonds for the building of a new chapel at a Christian
college without violating the Establishment Clause. See RESTATEMENT II.B.8; Sloan, 413 U.S.
at 833-35 (refusing to hold violative of the Equal Protection Clause a state tuition reimbursement plan, which was available to parents of nonpublic, nonsectarian school students
but not available to nonpublic sectarian school students, because the plan violated the
Establishment Clause).
The stated rule is in accord with Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct.
2481, 2498 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (indicating that Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), was wrongly decided; thus,
it appears there are five votes on the Court to overrule Aguilar).
102 Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1988 & Supp. IV
1992).
103 Title II of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (1988).
104 Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1988).
105 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-82 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see Shaare Tefila Congregation v.
Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987)(holding that § 1982, which prohibits racial discrimination in
the holding and conveyance of property, may redress discrimination against Jews).
106 18 U.S.C. § 247 (1988)(criminalizing damage to religious property and the
obstruction of persons in their free exercise of religion). See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S.
Ct. 2194 (1993) (sustaining constitutionality of legislation that enhanced the penalty for
conduct motivated by class hatred); cf. RAV. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538
(1992)(overturning ordinance that criminalized class specific hate speech).
The Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, 18 U.S.CA. § 248 (West Supp.
Sept. 1994), enacted May 26, 1994, contains a religious freedom amendment. Id. at §
248(a)(2), (3). The Act's prohibitions and punishments that apply to unlawful protest
activity at abortion clinics apply with equal force to those who disrupt services at houses
of worship.
107 See Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (upholding The Equal Access
Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (1988)).
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claimant's religion. °8 A claimant may disagree with coreligionists, be unsure or wavering,109 or be a recent
convert."' A claimant need not be a member of an organized religious denomination, community, or sect."'
However, a claimant must be sincere.'12
B. The Establishment Clause is not violated when a governmental restriction (or social program) merely reflects a
moral judgment, shared by some religions, about conduct
thought harmful (or beneficial) to society." 3 The Estab-

108 Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988)(rejecting free exercise test that "depend[s] on measuring the effects of a governmental
action on a religious objector's spiritual development"); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S.
252, 257 (1982) (rejecting government's argument that free exercise claim does not lie
unless "payment of social security taxes will . . . threaten the integrity of the Amish religious belief or observance"); Heffron v. International Soc'y of Krishna Consciousness,
452 U.S. 640, 652 (1981) (rejecting argument that solicitation of funds as part of church
ritual was entitled to greater weight than religious groups that solicit money but do not
ritualize the act); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981); see Employment
Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886-87 (1990); Laycock, supra note 97, at 1390-91; see also
supra note 77.
109 Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715-16. Additionally, it is sufficient if the practice in question
is religiously motivated. It would be an impoverished notion of religion that limits it to a
list of absolute do's and don'ts. For many major religious groups in America, obedience
by a religious claimant is often not religiously compelled but religiously motivated. The
teaching of a Sunday school class or volunteering to work in the church nursery, for
example, are done out of religious motive rather than compulsion. See Laycock, supra
note 97, at 1390-91. Although the text of the First Amendment reads in terms of "prohibiting the free exercise" of religion, not "making more difficult" the practice of one's
religion, it is assumed that religiously motivated observances are within the ambit of the
First Amendment. To do otherwise would work a significant discrimination against
nonabsolutist faiths and those without mandated creeds, confessions, or codes of canon
law. See RESTATEMENT II.B.4 (prohibiting such discrimination among religions). Moreover,
if the Free Exercise Clause were violated only when there was a direct prohibition on a
religious duty, then intentional discrimination against a religion that substantially burdened a religious practice but did not totally prohibit it, would not be a free exercise
violation. Cf. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217
(1993). Such an absurd result discredits reading "prohibiting" so narrowly. See Michael W.
McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understandingof Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 1409, 1486-88 (1990).
110 Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
111 Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Empl. Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989).
112 United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944); see Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715 ("One
can, of course, imagine an asserted claim so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to be entitled to protection under the Free Exercise Clause ....
").
113 Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 604 n.8, 613 (1988); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297, 319-20 (1980); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961); see Bob Jones Univ.
v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 n.30 (1983). Thus, overlap between a law's purpose
and religious moral teachings does not, without more, render the law one "respecting an
establishment of religion."
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lishment Clause is violated only when such a law violates 4 one of the rules set out in Restatement II.A or
ll.B.11

C.

Only beliefs and practices with a basis in religion are
protected by the Free Exercise Clause." S To avoid
omitting from protection unfamiliar and emerging religions, thereby discriminating among religions,"16 the

114 The rule stated in the text unravels the riddle of the "two definitions of religion." See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. The distinction is between a law
apparently based on morality and a law that cannot have any basis except in confessional
religion.
The key to resolving the definitional riddle is to distinguish between two viewpoints:
(i) the individual or organizational claimant's definition of religion; and (ii) the
government's definition of religion.
A Claimant's Viewpoint: For purposes of the inquiry into the "improper hindering of
religion," the subject of RESTATEMENT I, the aim is to adjust public affairs to the rights
claims of individual and organizational religionists. Therefore, the First Amendment's
definition of "religion" must remain broad and indeterminate for purposes of the Free
Exercise Clause.
A Government's Viewpoint: For purposes of the inquiry into the "improper helping
of religion," the subject of RESTATEMENT II, the aim is quite different. RESTATEMENT II's
goal is to prevent the danger to religious freedom that attends improper relations between the institutions of organized religion and the offices of state. Moreover, the focus
is on what government cannot do. See supra note 44. From the government's viewpoint,
the danger which the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid is not any and all governmental interaction with religion and religious organizations. That avoidance would lead to a
radically secular state. Rather, the Establishment Clause is to prevent only that governmental involvement with religion that may lead to the sort of evils that attend an establishment
of religion. That level of interaction happens when a government involves itself in the
intrinsically religious matters of worship and prayer and the propagation or inculcation of
matters that comprise confessional statements or creeds. The Supreme Court has labelled
such matters "inherently religious." See supra note 78.
The necessity of a fixed boundary in church-state relations requires a uniform legal
standard in drawing the line of separation between organized religion and the offices of
state. The line of separation cannot be drawn differently for each religious organization
based on its own unique definition of religion, for that would amount to governmental
discrimination among religions (a violation of the rule stated in RESTATEMENT II.B.4).
The requisite uniform line is the rule stated in RESTATEMENT III.B.
The Supreme Court has not resolved all of the problems in defining "religion" by
confining Establishment Clause analysis to matters "inherently religious." The Court's
determination as to what is "inherently religious" inevitably will favor the philosophy of
modern rationalism (its underlying ideas will appear nonreligious) while disfavoring familiar theistic religions such Christianity, Judaism, and Islam (their practices appearing
inherently religious). See Phillip E. Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First Amendment
Religious Doctrine, 72 CAL. L. REV. 817, 834-35 (1984). The Court has yet to address this
discontinuity in logic.
115 Fraz
489 U.S. at 833; Thomas, 450 U.S. at 713-14; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 215-16 (1972). Thus, the Free Exercise Clause is not an all-purpose conscience
clause. Cf. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
116 RESTATEMENT II.B.4.
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definition of religion remains broad and indeterminate,117 including naturalistic, nontheistic, and anthropocentric religions. 8 The definition excludes a purely personal and philosophical way of life. 1 9
Notwithstanding the many naysayers, the Restatement of the Law
of Religious Freedom shows that the Supreme Court's case law on
religious freedom is not at all in chaos. Although there are frequently sharp dissents and seriatim opinions when the Court decides a religion case, the center of the Court moves forward with
remarkable coherence in the result12 ° if not always in the rationale."' Nevertheless, accurately handling the vast body of religious freedom case law can be daunting. This is not only due to
the sheer number of decisions and the heavy media attention, but

also because the cases are difficult and, at least on first impression, appear conflicting. Acquiring a sure-handed grasp of the
cases is not possible in a short amount of time without an analytical tool like the Restatement.
To demonstrate the Restatement's utility, the third part of this
article puts its systematized rules to work testing out the scholarly
claim that the Supreme Court's religious freedom jurisprudence is

117 The definition of religion for purposes of the First Amendment is one of great
theoretical difficulty. But in the experience of the courts, the matter rarely becomes an
issue. Often the government stipulates to the claim "being religious," but then it raises
other defenses.
An excellent discussion on the question appears in Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197,
200 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring). Judge Adams' definition was later adopted in
Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 908 (1982).
Judge Adams was of the opinion that to be a religion for purposes of the First Amendment the putative religion must seek comprehensive answers to life's ultimate questions,
as well as evince characteristics such as clergy, sacred literature, holy days, formal services,
and efforts at propagation.
118 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (stating that a belief system qualifies
as a religion if it occupies a place in the claimant's life parallel to that filled by an orthodox belief in God); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961)(naming as
nontheistic religions: "Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, [and] Secular Humanism").
119 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-16. See CARTER, supra note 67, at 218 (if every idea that
.pretended to any organization of values or depth of commitment" is swept into the
definition of religion, it is hard to see what could be omitted).
120 Conceding that the Court's cases are coherent is, of course, altogether different
from agreeing with what the Court has done. See supra text accompanying note 55.
121 This is not to say that every modem case falls neatly into its place in the RESTATEMENT. As supra notes 79, 80 and 97 indicate, the results in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668 (1984), Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), and Texas Monthly, Inc. v.
Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989), are at odds with what, in the main, the Supreme Court has
done in its other cases decided from the 1940s to the present.
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being taken over by an equality-based rule of law.
III. IS A NEW THEORY BASED ON EQUALIY REPLACING AN OLDER
REGIME ROOTED IN SEPARATIONISM AND COERCION?

The Supreme Court's modern jurisprudence concerning religious freedom is commonly dated from Everson v. Board of Education,122 incorporating the Establishment Clause through the Fourteenth Amendment," and from Sherbert v. Verner,2 applying
for the first time a test of strict scrutiny to claims involving religious dissent.'2 5 It can generally be said that the Court's cases

beginning with Everson were animated by a theory of separationism.
Sixteen years after Everson, Sherbert not only sorted out whether
coercion of conscience was to get strict scrutiny review, but also
whether claims of indirect'26 coercion were actionable. Sherbert
answered the question in the affirmative, 127 so long as the burden on religion was "substantial."'28 By "substantial" the Court
meant that the religious dissenter must be forced to make a costly
and conscience-bound choice."2 This resembles the requirement

122 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (upholding state law reimbursing parents for cost of bussing
children to parochial school).
123 Id. at 15.
124 374 U.S. 398 (1963)(refusing to accept employment due to religious beliefs may
not disqualify claimant for unemployment compensation).
125 Id. at 406-09.
126 "Direct" coercion is governmental action that forbids or compels certain behavior.
The religious claimant must choose between obeying the law or obeying his or her faith.
"Indirect" coercion makes noncompliance with the law more difficult or expensive, but
not impossible. The religious claimant has a choice, albeit a cruel one, but compliance
with both law and faith is possible. In this sense, indirect coercion is merely a particularly harsh instance where the state's policies influence the religious choices of its citizens.
See infra note 129.
127 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404-05. The prior law was stated in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599, 605-07 (1961) (plurality opinion) (indirect burden on conscience not protected
by Free Exercise Clause; Sunday closing law did not prohibit religious practice of Orthodox Jewish merchant, it just made it more expensive).
128 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407. Sherbert also established for the first time that loss of a
statutory entitlement (as opposed to imposition of a criminal, tax, or regulatory duty)
could qualify as a burden on religion remediable under the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at
405-06.
129 Although all instances of "direct" coercion were actionable under the Free Exercise Clause, only some instances of "indirect" coercion were actionable. As to the latter,
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988), states when
indirect coercion invoked free exercise protection:
It is true that this Court has repeatedly held that indirect coercion or penalties
on the free exercise of religion, not just outright prohibitions, are subject to
scrutiny under the First Amendment .... This does not and cannot imply that
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in standing doctrine that one's injury be both personal and concrete in order to state a justiciable claim of constitutional wrongdoing.'
With increasing frequency during the 1980s and 1990s, the
Court has applied a rule based in equality 3 to reach some of its
results thereby ameliorating undesirable (in its view) implications
3 2 This raises the
of the separationist and coercion-based theories."
ambitious claim' that the Establishment Clause cases are best
incidental effects of government programs, which may make it more difficult to
practice certain religions but which have no tendency to coerce individuals into
acting contrary to their religious beliefs, require government to bring forward a
compelling justification of its otherwise lawful actions.
Id. at 450-51.
130 To have standing to raise a constitutional claim, a plaintiff personally must have
suffered some actual or threatened harm as a result of the putatively unconstitutional
conduct of the state. Moreover, courts are to refrain from "abstract questions" which
amount to "generalized grievances" shared by many others. Valley Forge Christian College
v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 470-75 (1982).
131 In lieu of the word "equality," the courts and commentators often substitute the
descriptor "neutrality." See, e.g., infra note 136. "Neutral," however, is not as satisfactory as
the word "equal." To be "equal" offers more guidance to those who are trying to understand the law or faithfully administer it. The courts have considerable experience with
what equality means in a variety of contexts.
"Neutrality" is prone to rhetoric and to other ideological exploitation. Everyone says
they are in favor of a government "neutral" toward religion, but it can mean many different things. Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment
Neutrality And The "No Endorsement" Tes4 86 MICH. L. REv. 266, 313-31 (1987); John T.
Valauri, The Concept of Neutrality in Establishment Clause Doctrine, 48 U. PIr. L. REV. 83, 93
(1986). Having shunned the Lemon test, the Court is without a unifying doctrine for the
Establishment Clause. For the Court to take up uttering "neutrality," almost as a mantra,
is rhetorically safe but offers little analytical assistance.
Whenever the word "neutrality" appears in the Court's cases it is presumably a synonym for equality. When one uses "equal" to describe a law, there are four possible
meanings: not discriminatory on its face, no discriminatory purpose, no discriminatory
motive, and no discriminatory effect or impact.
132 See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). The Court in Smiththought it difficult to make individualized governmental assessments concerning the impact of general law on religious practice; id. at 884-85; inadvisable for courts to make
determinations concerning centrality of religious practice to a religion; id. at 886-87; and,
not tolerable for each person to be a law unto himself or herself if religious-based conscience excuses obedience to general law, id. at 888-90.
133 Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L REV. 230, 232,
237, 246, 249, 256, 263, 279 (1994); see also Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the
Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 311 (1986). The scholarly endeavor at syntheses, of course, is laudable.
One of the tasks of the academic is to classify, to pull together an unruly set of materials into a uniform explanation, if you will. Physicists, for example, have tried for years to
arrive at a Unified Field Theory. Such a theory would tie together the four basic forces
of gravity, electromagnetism, and the strong and weak nuclear forces. Proposing unifying
theories of law is one of the major chores that occupies scholars.
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understood as a collision of two competing theories of churchstate relations. The claim is that the confusion in Establishment
Clause cases manifests a larger struggle: the replacing of the old
regime of separationism with a new regime of equality." Moreover, the claim maintains that the unexpected adoption of a new
Free Exercise Clause test in the peyote case of Employment Division
v. Smith 35 similarly replaces a theory rooted in prohibiting coer-

cion of conscience with a theory focused on governmental equality.
It is an intriguing proposition to say that one can drop a template of equality onto recent cases that will not only bring organization to the Court's jurisprudence but also project future
trends. Using the Restatement of the Law of Religious Freedom, the
following discussion tests the thesis that the Court is moving its
Religion Clauses jurisprudence away from a separation/coercion
paradigm and toward an equality-based theory.
In an equality-based model, where the word "neutral" is synonymous with "equal," the courts and commentators often say that
government must be neutral as to religion.13 6 That is, government must not only regard all religions equally, but also regard
religion and nonreligion equally. Superficially, an equality-based
theory presents certain attractions. First, it seems less anti-religious,
at least to those who desire to see religious education and social
services funded equally alongside government-operated schools and
welfare programs. Second, it is thought to restrain successfully the
judge tempted to interject his or her own biases into the resolution of a case. l" 7
If the claim that the Court is moving from a separation model to one of equality is correct, then this thesis should explain the
evolution of the Court's cases over the last half century from
Everson to the present. What follows are five comparisons of clus-

134 The turning point in this regard ("a key signal") is attributed to the Court's decision in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Lupu, supra note 133, at 246.
135 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
136 See, e.g., Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2487, 2491
(1994). Concerning the indeterminate nature of "neutrality" as a juridical concept, see
supra note 131.
137 In the separation/coercion paradigm, the Court adopted balancing tests for the
Religion Clauses. Balancing tests do leave more room for lower court judges to skew the
outcome in close cases. An equality-based test is more mechanical in its implementation,
leaving less leeway for a judge's own values to influence the outcome of First Amendment cases. It is another matter, of course, to agree that this apparent attraction is actually realized.
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ters of like cases, a task made easier by use of the Restatement of the
Law of Religious Freedom. Each comparison is structured around the
equality-based theory versus the separationist paradigm.
FIRST COMPARISON
Equality as the rule of law is the norm when it comes to
private speech of religious content. When the speech takes place
on public property, or as the cases say "speech in a public forum,"
equal access is the rule."M The leading cases are Widmar v. Vincent,' a free speech case involving content discrimination; Board
of Education v. Mergens,"'4 upholding the Equal Access Act in the
face of a separationist attack; and Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches
14
" ' the recent free speech holding involvUnion Free School District,
ing viewpoint discrimination.
When the expression is governmental speech, however, the
controlling norm is separationism, not equality." The leading
cases here are Lee v. Weisman,' County of Allegheny v. ACLU"
School District v.
Stone v. Graham," Epperson v. Arkansas,'
Schempp, 47 Engel v. Vitale," and all the way back to 1948 and
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education."

138 See RESTATEMENT 1.A2.
139 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
140 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
141 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
142 See RESTATEMENT II.A.
143 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992)(striking down prayer in conjunction with commencement
ceremonies at public junior high school).
144 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (disallowing display of Christmas nativity scene inside courthouse, but upholding display of Menorah outside of public building which was part of
larger holiday scene).
145 449 U.S. 39 (1980)(per curiam) (striking down state law requiring posting of Ten
Commandments in public school classrooms).
146 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (striking down state law prohibiting teaching theory of evolution in public schools).
147 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (prohibiting devotional reading of Bible and recitation of
Lord's Prayer in public schools).
148 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (prohibiting state requirement of daily classroom prayer in
public schools).
149 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (prohibiting program in which local volunteers came to public
school campus to teach religion). Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), and Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), are the two aberrations. But Lynch and Marsh, while
antiseparationist to be sure, are not equality driven. Rather, in their rationale, Lynch and
Marsh are driven by a desire to cling to historical practices dating from a time when
America was less religiously plural.
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SECOND COMPARISON

Equality is the operative principle when governmental benefits
are directed to all individuals without regard to religion, who are
given complete freedom of choice regarding how they may
"spend" that benefit. 50 The leading cases are Mueller v. Allen,'
Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind,'52 and the
recent decision in Zobrest.' Federal child-care vouchers for lowincome parents of preschool children fall here as well. 54
However, when governmental aid flows directly to institutions,
including religious organizations among others, then separationism
is the Supreme Court's principal concern. If the organizational
recipient is "pervasively sectarian," then separationism mandates no
5
aid, even though such a result is manifestly unequal. ,

Most of

the cases in this area involve primary and secondary parochial
schools. But Bowen v. Kendrick5 also requires a case-by-case review so that pervasively sectarian teenage counseling centers are
denied government grants.
THIRD COMPARISON
Equality is the legal norm when the issue is governmental aid
to religion, if the same benefit is not available to others similarly
situated. The Court strikes down such aid, an arrangement favoring religion over nonreligion, as unequal. 5 The prominent case
is Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist.'-5

150 See RESTATEMENT II.C.3.
151 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (upholding state income tax deduction for parents paying
parochial school tuition and other educational costs).
152 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (upholding state aid to blind individual attending sectarian
school for a degree used to enter a religious vocation).
153 Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993) (providing interpreter to deaf student attending parochial high school does not violate Establishment
Clause).
154 The Child Care and Development Block Grant Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 98589858q (Supp. IV 1993). The act allows parents receiving child care certificates to purchase child care at a center operated by a church or other religious organization. Id. at
§§ 9858n(2), 9858k(a), 9858c(c) (2) (A) (i) (I).
155 See RESTATEMENT II.B.8.
156 487 U.S. 589 (1988). In Bowen, the Adolescent Family Life Act was upheld "on its
face," but the Court remanded for case-by-case reviews as to recipients of governmental
grants that were religious organizations. Id. at 600-02, 622.
157 See RESTATEMENT II.B.7.
158 413 U.S. 756 (1973)(holding unconstitutional state aid when available to religious
schools but not public and private nonsectarian schools).
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However, when the issue is legislative exemptions for religious
practices and organizations, exemptions not afforded the nonreligious, separation of church and state is controlling. Here, government refrains from imposing a burden on religion "to complement and reinforce the desired separation insulating each from
1 9 Corporation of Presiding
the other.""
Bishop v. Amos"6 fits into
this line of authority, as does Walz v. Tax Commission,' United
States v. Seeger,6 and, for example, the exemption for religious
organizations in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1 9 9 0 ."
FOURTH COMPARISON
Equality is the operative principle when it comes to generally
applicable social welfare regulation and taxation, including the
regulation and taxation of religious organizations. Government
may regulate religious organizations so long as it also regulates
similarly situated secular organizations.' The principal cases are
Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labo?' and Jimmy
Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization." Of course, government cannot target or single out religion for regulation or taxation. That would be unequal." 7 The definitive cases are Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah"M and McDaniel v.
69
Paty.1
However, the equality-based principle in Alamo and Swaggart is
permissive only. It is not required of government if the legislature
should want to "leave religion where it found it" by providing a
statutory exemption for religion. 7 Under the Supreme Court's
cases, the elected branches of government have a choice: to im159 Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970). See RESTATEMENT II.C.1.
160 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (upholding religious discrimination exemption for religious
organizations in Civil Rights Act of 1964).
161 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding property tax exemption for churches).
162 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (upholding exemption from military draft for religious pacifists).
163 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. V 1993). The religious exemption appears in §
12187.
164 See RESTATEMENT I.C (last sentence).
165 471 U.S. 290 (1985) (Fair Labor Standards Act).
166 493 U.S. 378 (1990) (sales and use taxes).
167 See RESTATEMENT I.B.2.
168 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993)(municipal ordinances regulating ritual sacrifices of animals
violates Free Exercise Clause).
169 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (disqualifying clergy from holding public office violates religious freedom).
170 See RESTATEMENT II.C.1.
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pose a regulatory burden or to exempt religious institutions from
the burden. It is a choice between equality or separationism. Subject to the rules protecting institutional autonomy, the Court will
sustain whichever path is taken by the legislative and executive
branches.
FFfTH COMPARISON
As a final comparison, when the issue concerns the civil
courts being asked' to take jurisdiction of ecclesiastical disputes,
separationism is required by the Supreme Court."' Typical examples are when a church splits or when a cleric is unhappy over a
failed appointment to a religious office. The prominent cases are
73 Presbyterian
Watson v. Jones,7 ' Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral,'
Church v. Hull Church,74 and Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich.17' The principle of law is judicial deference to the
adjudicatory tribunals within the church.
However, in a limited way the Court has even allowed equality
to seep into these property dispute cases under the rubric of "neutral principles of law." 76 The neutral principles approach is best
understood as the civil judge reviewing the relevant documents
"religiously blind" as he or she seeks to give effect to the secular
provisions thereof. If a neutral principles review is successful, neither faction is helped or hurt by religion. Rather, the ownership
of the property will go to the faction as indicated by the "blinded"
secular law. Legally controlling, then, is the notion of equality before the letter of the civil law.' 77
As with the fourth comparison, the adoption of a neutral
principles standard of review is by prudential choice. The Supreme
Court has said that each state may apply either neutral principles
or judicial deference to the appropriate church tribunal. 78

171 See RESTATEMENT I.C.1.
172 80 U.S. 679 (1871) (barring federal courts from interfering in matters of church
doctrine, discipline, and polity).
173 344 U.S. 94 (1952) (holding that state's undertaking to transfer control of church
from governing hierarchy in foreign country to local authorities in the United States
violates First Amendment).
174 393 U.S. 440 (1969) (prohibiting civil court from awarding church property on
basis of interpretation of doctrine).
175 426 U.S. 696 (1976) (prohibiting civil courts from probing into church polity in
dispute over removal of cleric from ecclesiastical office).
176 See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 600-08 (1979).
177 See RESTATEMENT I.C.2.
178 Wolf 443 U.S. at 608.
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Therefore, the appropriate lawmaker in each state (either the
state's highest court or the legislature) may select a rule based on
equality (neutral principles) or one based on separationism (judicial deference).
To summarize the result of these five comparisons of cases
following a separationist model with cases adopting an equalitybased model, three types of situations appear:
1. instances of mandated equality;
2. instances of mandated separation; and
3. instances where the First Amendment rule is to leave the
matter to the discretion of the appropriate lawmaking
branch.
It is apparent that going back many years there are examples
of the Court following a rule of equality. Accordingly, an equalitybased model was not an invention of the Court in the early
1980s.'79 On the other hand, right up to the Supreme Court as
presently constituted, there are numerous instances where the
Court is following separationism as the controlling principle-or,
in the alternative, allowing the legislature to decide between a
separationist-based or an equality-based rule of law."
Contrary to what was claimed, equality is not the talisman that
will guide one through the thicket of cases on religious freedom.
Rather, the distinction between separationism versus equality is
only one of several relevant-but not controlling-considerations.
As is evident from the broad framework made possible by the
Restatement, other important distinctions are: (i) speech versus
nonspeech; (ii) private speech versus government speech; (iii)
individuals versus religious organizations; (iv) benefits versus burdens; and (v) laws where morality and religion overlap versus laws
that are inherently religious.'
All of these distinctions, often
lashed together in twos or threes to form a rule, 8 ' are used by
179 Cf. supra note 134.
180 Like Mark Twain's famous cable from London ("Reports of my recent death are
greatly exaggerated."), obviously the foregoing comparison does not bear out that
separationism is either dead or dying. Cf. Lupu, supra note 133. However, Professor Lupu
does make the useful point that separationism is no longer dominant. Separationism's
flood has gone past its high-water mark, but it is still a deep current that promises to
continue to shape the modem Court.
181 See supra text accompanying note 113.
182 For example, RESTATEMENT II.C.2, a complex rule of law, combines four different
distinctions: the rule pertains to benefits as opposed to burdens; it pertains to such benefits being conferred directly to religious organizations as opposed to benefits paid to
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the Supreme Court to decide religious freedom cases.
These various distinctions are just ripples on the surface of
the Court's case law indicating the presence of deeper currents.
Just what are the first principles that underlie what it means to be
a nation that guarantees ftill religious freedom? That is the subject
of the fourth part of this article.
IV.

DIFFERING VISIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT'S
PURPOSE REGARDING RELIGION

As an analytical tool-with all the limitations implicit in that
term-the Restatement is not able to trace its rules back to the
philosophical presuppositions that underpin the Supreme Court's
religious freedom case law. The systemization imposed by the
Restatement is possible because its rules are sufficiently distant from
theory so that coherence rather than conflict reigns. Once one
moves beyond the facile and goes in search of philosophical underpinnings, then the contradictions appear. In such an undertaking, however, the Restatement is suggestive of a taxonomy of key
ideas. Concerning religious freedom, the Court's opinions variously
envision the purpose of the First Amendment as: (i) protecting
the individual from coercion; (ii) protecting the society from religion; (iii) protecting religion from the state; (iv) protecting religious choice from being influenced by the state; and (v) protecting religious institutions that serve both as a counterweight to the
power of the modern state and as communities of ultimate meaning. These five visions are sometimes complementary as they pursue the overall goal of religious freedom. Occasionally some of
them overlap and thus lead, for different reasons, to the same
result. And at times they conflict, thus dividing the Court.
A.

Protectingthe Religiously Informed Conscience

Protection from coercion"' is rooted in the key idea of conscience, both individual conscience and the collective conscience

individuals who in turn choose to use their benefit at a religious organization, cf. RESTATEMENT II.C.3; the rule pertains only to social or educational services that are not
inherently religious as opposed to services where the transmission of inherently religious
beliefs is likely, cf. RESTATEMENT II.B.8; and, finally, the benefit must be available, not
only to religious groups, but also secular organizations similarly situated, cf RESTATEMENT
II.B.7.
183 Coercion is further broken down into "direct" and "indirect" coercion. See supra
notes 126 and 129.
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represented by the sum of the individual members of a unified
religious community, society, or sect. Conscience is a psychological
abstraction indicative of a person's sense of the moral good,
joined with the felt duty to do that which is right or proper in a
given circumstance. It is based on the widely held metaphysical
belief in the inviolable dignity and incalculable worth of each human being. Compulsion of an individual to act contrary to his or
her conscience is regarded as a violation of the person, something
to be avoided except for the most compelling of societal interests.
A right to an avoidance of compulsion with respect to conscience must not, however, be overstated. A government that extends tolerance to religionists who find themselves at odds with
generally applicable, facially neutral laws by providing exemptions
from such laws is a government that has not invaded conscience.
Indeed, nations that still have established churches do not violate
the consciences of their dissenting citizens, so long as exemptions
are made available as a matter of legislative grace.
This is not to say that tolerance and the right of conscience
are the same. They do lead to the same result so far as the positive law of religious freedom. But tolerance holds that the origin
of religious rights is the state's grace. The right of conscience, in
contrast, is an assertion that individuals owe an allegiance to some
higher authority that is prior to the duty of citizens to obey the
state. The right of conscience thereby implies a limited state.
Preventing coercion of conscience is a theme that surfaces at
several points throughout the Court's First Amendment case law.
Restatement I.A.1 states the rule against compelling a belief contrary
to one's religion, and Restatement I.B.1 reflects the rule against
placing an individual in the position of having to prove the truth
of his or her religious claims.
When faced with intrachurch disputes over property, Restatemernt I.C.2 reflects the option given to the states to follow a neutral
principles approach in lieu of following a rule of judicial deference to church tribunal decisions. The holding in Jones v. Wolf 4
was a concession by the Court to those wanting to protect against
coercion of dissident members by their church, but at the cost of
reduced protection for institutional autonomy." As discussed below," 6 the notion of institutional autonomy is born of a First

184
185
186

443 U.S. 595 (1979).
See id. at 610-21 (Powell, J., dissenting).
See infra Part W.C.
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Amendment vision-not of conscience-but of protecting organized religion from the state. The neutral principles approach is
more accommodating to the concerns of conscience than is judicial deference because it prevents some extreme cases where ecclesiastical authorities deal arbitrarily with the grievances of church
members or dissenting clerics concerning matters of doctrinal
change or interpretation. 7
Conscience was of foremost concern in the Court's inclusion
of nontheistic, newly emerging, and evolving religions within the
First Amendment's definition of "religion,""u so that individuals
are free to seek spiritual refreshment wherever their conscience
may lead." 9 Preventing the invasion of conscience was one of
the Court's concerns, as reflected by the several rules in Restatement III.A concerning recent and uncertain converts, religious
claimants without church affiliation, and the avoidance of judicial
inquiry into the "centrality" of a religious belief."9
The Court's protection of conscience was unquestionably
weakened by the decision in Employment Division v. Smith, l9' rendering nonactionable a generally applicable law's discriminatory effect. "92
' But even Smith explicitly stated that the legislative and executive branches were empowered to regard the needs of conscience by adopting exemptions directed to religious practices.
Indeed, the enactment of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act "94
' was Congress's way of dispensing religious exemptions
wholesale. Less sweeping examples of legislation that take into
account the needs of conscience are found in the civil rights acts

187 See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 726-27
(1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
188 See RESTATEMENT III.C.
189 A secondary concern was that, by adopting too narrow a definition of religion,
the courts thereby discriminate against unfamiliar and new religions. That would be contrary to the rule in RESTATEMENT II.B.4. Thus, the rationale for RESTATEMENT III.C is two
fold: avoiding coercion of conscience and avoiding inhibition of religious choice. See infra
Part IV.D.
190 The other concern reflected in RESTATEMENT III.A is safeguarding institutional
autonomy. See infra Part IV.C.
191 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Justice Scalia, for the majority, argued that religiously informed conscience cannot be so elevated as to become a law unto itself. The needs of
organized society, as reflected in uniform laws democratically enacted, place legitimate demands on citizens. Further, religion today comes in so many varieties that for the law to
have to adjust to the claims of such a vast number of faiths would plunge civil authorities deeply into religious affairs. Id. at 886-89.
192 See RESTATEMENT I.B.2.
193 Id. at 890.
194 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (Supp. V 1993).
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noted in Restatement II.C.5.
B.

Protecting the Society from Religion

The protection of domestic society from an aggressive religion
co-opting the state and seizing the levers of civil power is one of
the key ideas behind separationism.As Chief Justice Warren stated
the matter in McGowan v. Maryland,95 certain arrangements between organized religion and the offices of state are "feared because of [their] tendencies to political tyranny and subversion of
civil authority." 9 ' Religion is viewed as potentially divisive within
the body politic.9 7 Although "establishments" are instinctively
thought of as causing harm to religious minorities, a collusion of
church and state can cause injury to nonreligious interests as well.
Therefore, those suffering purely economic or commercial harm
also have standing to challenge violations of the Establishment
Clause.'9 8 Separationism makes it a First Amendment value to
prevent religion from exercising political power that disrupts the
domestic peace.'99
The other key idea behind separationism is called
"voluntarism," meaning that religious societies are most genuine
when their supporters arise from responding hearts and minds
unassisted as well as undeterred by government. The term comes
from the separationist insistence that an authentic church must be
a voluntary church. The use of the term "voluntarism" can be confusing, for it is not used narrowly in the sense of uncoerced

195 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
196 Id, at 430. Of course, the First Amendment-indeed, the entire Bill of
Rights-protects individuals, not the government. See supra note 44 and accompanying
text. Hence, strictly speaking, the First Amendment cannot protect the state from religion, but it can protect individuals within the society from a religion that has grasped
civil power.
197 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987)("ITihe public school is at once
the symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive means for promoting our common
destiny. In no activity of the State is it more vital to keep out divisive forces than in its
schools.") (citation and internal quotation omitted); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236,
254 (1968)(Black, J., dissenting) ("[Ajid to religion and religious schools generates discord, disharmony, hatred, and strife among our people, and that any government that
supplies such aids is to that extent a tyranny.")
198 366 U.S. at 430-31.
199 As a result of their concern, separationists focus on religious conduct that disrupts
the domestic peace. However, they cannot properly seek to suppress speech that is'politically disruptive or divisive. The latter is protected by the Free Speech Clause. See infra
text accompanying notes 241-46.
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faith.2" Nor is the term used broadly in the sense of a positive
freedom for religious choice."' 1 Rather, "voluntarism" means freedom from active governmental involvement in religious affairs.
The story of disestablishment in America is in substantial part
an account of the efforts of Protestant dissenters who sought separation-not just for the sake of conscience-but also to avoid
theological corruption.0 2 Thus, the separation of church and
state also prevents government's misguided desire to favor a religion in ways that end up having the unintended result of harming
it203

For separationists, an active involvement by government in
religion can corrupt religion in several ways. Religion worthy of
respect must come about through the appeal of its doctrine rather
than through the attraction of its adherents to the advantages
secured by civil privilege. ° Moreover, to accept governmental

200
201
202

See supra Part IVA.
See infra Part IV.D.
McConnell, supra note 109, at 1437-43, 1445-49; Michael J. Sandel, Freedom of Conscience or Freedom of Choice? in ARTICLES OF FAITH, ARTICLES OF PEACE: THE RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY CLAUSES AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 74, 83-84 (James D. Hunter &
Os Guinness eds., 1990); see MARK D. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 7-19 (1965); see generally
WILLIAM G. McLOUGHLIN, NEW ENGLAND DISSENT: THE BAPTISTS AND THE SEPARATION OF
CHURCH AND STATE, 1633-1833 (1971).
203 Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2474 (1993) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he provision of a state-paid sign-language interpreter may pose serious
problems for the church as well as for the state. Many sectarian schools impose religiously based rules of conduct ....
To require public employees to obey such rules
would impermissibly threaten individual liberty, but to fail to do so might endanger religious autonomy ....
The Establishment Clause was designed to avert exactly this sort of
conflict."); Agnilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 409-10 (1985)("The principle that the state
should not become too closely entangled with the church in the administration of assistance is rooted in two concerns. When the state becomes enmeshed with a given denomination in matters of religious significance, the freedom of religious belief of those
who are not adherents of that denomination suffers, even when the governmental purpose underlying the involvement is largely secular. In addition, the freedom of even the
adherents of the denomination is limited by the governmental intrusion into sacred matters."); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962) (explaining that the purpose of the Establishment Clause goes beyond prevention of coercion, for "[its first and most immediate purpose rested on the belief that a union of government and religion tends to
destroy government and to degrade religion").
204 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 53 (1985)(The First Amendment embraces "the
conviction that religious beliefs worthy of respect are the product of free and voluntary
choice by the faithful."); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 259-60 (1963)(Brennan,
J., concurring)("It is not only the nonbeliever who fears the injection of sectarian doctrines and controversies into the civil polity, but in as high degree it is the devout believer who fears the secularization of a creed which becomes too deeply involved with and
dependent upon the government. It has rightly been said of the history of the EstablishHeinOnline -- 70 Notre Dame L. Rev. 626 1994-1995
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assistance is to concede the government's jurisdiction over the
affairs of the church. 5 Professing and practicing religion out of
civic convention confuses the traditions of the nation with the
sacred and confounds religious symbols and holy days with the
patriotic." 6 This can soon drift into the corruption known as civiI religion, where culture and nationalism go hand-in-hand with
spirituality."' Finally, when churches become unduly involved
with the agencies of government, they risk being subverted because their ministries are redirected to meet ends chosen by government.0 8 Having lost their independence by allying with gov-

ment Clause that our tradition of civil liberty rests not only on the secularism of a
Thomas Jefferson but also on the fervent sectarianism ...
of a Roger Williams.") (footnote, internal quotation and citation omitted); Enge4 370 U.S. at 431-32 ("The history of
governmentally established religion, both in England and in this country, showed that
whenever government had allied itself with one particular form of religion, the inevitable
result had been that it had incurred the hatred, disrespect and even contempt of those
who held contrary beliefs. That same history showed that many people had lost their
respect for any religion that had relied upon the support of government to spread its
faith. The Establishment Clause thus stands as an expression of principle on the part of
the Founders of our Constitution that religion is too personal, too sacred, too holy, to
permit its 'unhallowed perversion' by a civil magistr-ate.") (footnotes omitted).
205 Justice Jackson, dissenting in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), wrote:
Nor should I think that those who have done so well without this aid would
want to see this separation between Church and State broken down. If the state
may aid these religious schools, it may therefore regulate them. Many groups
have sought aid from tax funds only to find that it carried political controls with
it. Indeed this Court has declared that [i]t is hardly lack of due process for the
Government to regulate that which it subsidizes.
Id. at 27-28 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (citation and internal quotation omitted). See also
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 266 & n.7 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (aid to religious schools results in harm to both the public and the
religion that the aid is meant to serve).
206 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 727 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The
creche has been relegated to the role of a neutral harbinger of the holiday season, useful for commercial purposes, but devoid of any inherent meaning and incapable of enhancing the religious tenor of a display of which it is an integral part ....
Surely, this
is a misuse of a sacred symbol.").
207 Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2659 (1992) (rejecting argument that ecumenical
prayers at school commencement ceremony are de minimis because of their "civic or nonsectarian" character;, civil religion is religion nonetheless, or its confederate); Schempp, 374
U.S. at 284-87 (Brennan, J., concurring) (warning against "watering down" of religious
practices).
208 Justice Blackmun states the point as follows:
When the government favors a particular religion or sect, the disadvantage to all
others is obvious, but even the favored religion may fear being "taint[ed] . . .
with a corrosive secularism." Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385
(1985). The favored religion may be compromised as political figures reshape
the religion's beliefs for teir own purposes; it may be reformed as government
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ernment, churches become compromised in their efforts to define
and follow their calling, and they lose in the bargain the ability to
speak critically of the state to which they are now beholden.
The foregoing is a fully flowered description of voluntarism,
the idea that separationism erects a barrier to government involvement in religious concerns. 2' No coercion of conscience need
be shown to state a claim that voluntarism is violated. 10 Indeed,
the Court has devised a special rule of justiciability such that even
federal taxpayers have standing to bring actions claiming that the
principle of separationism is violated.211 The constitutional harm
is not defined by personal damages suffered by the party before
the Court.212 The Court struck close to the heart of separationist
largesse brings government regulation. Keeping religion in the hands of private
groups minimizes state intrusion on religious choice and best enables each religion to "flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its
dogma." [Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952)].
Wdsman, 112 S. Ct. at 2666 (footnote omitted); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 620
(1971) (State aid "is a relationship pregnant with dangers of excessive government direction of church schools and hence of churches . . . [We cannot ignore here the danger that pervasive modem governmental power will ultimately intrude on religion and
thus conflict with the Religion Clauses."); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736,
775 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I would add emphasis to the pernicious tendency of a
state subsidy to tempt religious schools to compromise their religious mission without
wholly abandoning it.").
209 See Donald A. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development:
Part 1I. The Nonestablishment Principe, 81 HARv. L. REV. 513, 517 (1968):
Religious voluntarism . . . is an important aspect of the freedom of conscience
guaranteed by the free exercise clause. But a broad interpretation of the establishment clause also gives vent to the social dimension of this value by restricting the use of political power in shaping the ideological and sociological
forces which give social form to religion. The growth and advancement of a
religious sect must come from the voluntary support of its membership. Religious voluntarism thus conforms to that abiding part of the American credo
which assumes that both religion and society will be strengthened if spiritual and
ideological claims seek recognition on the basis of their intrinsic merit.
Id. at 517 (footnote omitted).
210 School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963)(a free exercise claim must be
predicated on coercion whereas the no-establishment provision is not so constrained);
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962)(same). Coercion is no doubt present in many
separationists cases, but it is not an element of the claim. This is illustrated by Stone v.
Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980)(per curiam), where the Court struck down a Kentucky statute requiring public schools to post the Ten Commandments in classrooms, provided that
private donations paid the expense. The student and teacher complainants suffered no
coercion, nor did taxpayers or others suffer economic harm as a result of the displays.
Students were free to ignore the Commandments. At most students were exposed to
unwelcomed ideas. Nevertheless, the Court held that the principle of separationism was
violated by the state's religious message.
211 See supra note 19.
212 See Mark E. Chopko, Religious Access to Public Programs and Governmental Funding
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values when it said that "the three main concerns against which
the Establishment Clause sought to protect [were] sponsorship,
financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.""'
Nevertheless,
the outer boundaries , of
separationism's reach are difficult to ascertain, especially when the
issue is framed in terms of civic divisiveness and the point at
which government has violated the concept of voluntarism.1 4 But
the centering postulates of separationism are not in doubt: domestic peace inures from government's disengagement from religious

60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 645 (1992), for one lawyer's frustration with two of voluntarism's
implications: (a) that religious organizations seeking governmental funds should be protected from bringing theological harm upon themselves; and (b) that taxpayers are empowered to complain of vicarious harm to religious groups in general just because some
religious groups receive governmental funding.
The central component of the constitutional argument levied against allowing religious institutions access to public programs and governmental funds is
that denial of access is somehow consistent with preserving the religious liberty
of all religious groups, not just those who oppose access [to funding] but those
who seek it as well . . . I
For those who choose to become a part of the governmental program, the
principle volenti non fit injuria ("He who consents has no injury or complaint")
would seem to apply.

Id. at 660, 663 (footnote omitted).
213 Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677 (1971)(internal quote omitted).
214 This point is expanded upon by Professor John Garvey.
This is why we have had a succession of difficult establishment clause
standing cases . . . . Though the plaintiffs usually get into court, they do so
only because the Court has relaxed the usual rules. School prayer plaintiffs can
sue even if they are not coerced . . . . School aid plaintiffs can sue as taxpayers . . . .These claimants have a distinctly non-Hohfeldian character. Their role
is to bring problems to the Court's attention. But the Court does not resolve
those problems by asking what are the contours of the plaintiff' rights...
what kind of performance is due to them. Instead it asks whether, all things
considered, we want the government doing this.
Those who complain that the Supreme Court has not been consistent
about forbidding prayer and school aid sometimes lose sight of this point. If the
Court is not constrained by some principle like the rights of the parties before
it, it has discretion to draw lines in arbitrary places ....
... The occurrence of [some recognizable] harm is what entitles the
[normal] claimant to complain. This is how rights are violated.
. . . But in most of the modem [establishment clause] cases it is hard to
identify the individual harm caused by a violation. Suppose that public school
officials call for voluntary prayer initiated by students. Or suppose the government offers chapter I aid to students in religious schools. These practices are
clearly unconstitutional under the current rules . . . . But it is not clear that
they cause harm to the claimants who complain about them.
Garvey, supra note 8, at 278-79.
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affairs, and organized religion flourishes best when it is free of the
adulterating patronage of government. These twin aims mean that
religious organizations must be barred from certain types of governmental support because, paradoxically, the support is harmful
to the religion's continued vitality.
Implicit in separationism's aim to avoid social divisiveness
along religious lines is that there are, as a matter of political philosophy, mutually exclusive spheres of operation for the institutions of church and state. 215 Each is to operate independent of
the other and in its own domain. Voluntarism, as well, insists on
this ordering of church and state, but as an article of faith rather
than of secular politics, tenets originating within eighteenth century Protestant dissent.
This raises the question as to how this "natural ordering" of
these two institutions was codified into the First Amendment. The
usual answers resorted to are threefold: it was the intent of the
drafters of the Bill of Rights in the Congress of 1789; or it was
generally set down by the American founders; or more generally
still, it arises from the political philosophy and Protestant dissenter
traditions of America's early nationhood. But the literal meaning
of the text of the amendment is not self-evident.21 6 The record
left by the founding fathers is mixed and, in places, contradictory.217 And lastly, tradition, as binding on successor generations, is

215 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948)("[Tlhe First
Amendment rests upon the premise that both religion and government can best work to
achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from the other within its respective sphere.").
216 Compare Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential"Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875, 885-902 (1986) (theory of nonpreferentialism is
wrong) with MICHAEL J. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS: THE INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 40 (1978) (concluding that nonpreferentialism is consistent with the original intent of the Religion Clauses). The Senate wrote the version closest to the final text of the First Amendment, but it left only sketchy notes as to what
the majority in the Senate had in mind. The record of the debate in the House of Representatives is more extensive and there were several amendments, some rejected and
others adopted, but still without full explanations. See T. JEREMY GUNN, A STANDARD FOR
REPAIR: THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE, EQUALITY AND NATURAL RIGHTS 41-67 (1992).
217 See, e.g., ARLIN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J. EMMERICH, A NATION DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES (1990); ROBERT
L

CORD,

SEPARATION

OF CHURCH AND

STATE:

HISTORICAL FACT AND

CURRENT FICTION

(1982); THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE
PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986); WILLIAM R. ESTEP, REVOLUTION WITHIN THE
REVOLUTION: THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT, 1612-1789 (1990); EDUTIN S.
GAUSTAD, NEITHER KING NOR PRELATE: RELIGION AND THE NEW NATION, 1776-1826 (1993);
GUNN, supra note 216; LEW, supra note 82; WILLIAM L. MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY: RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1986).
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not compelling to those who arrived later or who do not care for
the results of separationist theology." 8
The two ideas behind separationism, voluntarism and preventing political abuse at the behest of religion, are evident in the
Court's rules that prohibit government from confessing inherently
religious beliefs and from urging that individuals do the same. 21 9
Justice O'Connor's "no-endorsement test," first advanced in the
Christmas nativity case of Lynch v. Donnelly,22 retains separationist
sympathies. However, no-endorsement focuses on how an "objective observer" would respond to the government's speech by asking if the symbol "sends a message to nonadherents that they are
outsiders, not full members of the political community" and if the
speech is regarded as favoring religions that have "access to government or governmental powers not fully shared by nonadherents
of the religion." 22' Accordingly, no-endorsement appears to divert
part of its attention to preventing coercion of conscience. 2 The
no-endorsement test thereby weakens separationism. Separationism
focuses primarily on patrolling the boundary between church and
state regardless of whether an individual (the reasonable, objective
observer or otherwise) either resents or welcomes the
government's sponsorship of religious symbols.

218 For example, John Courtney Murray states the traditional Roman Catholic view in
conciliatory tones. Catholics accede to the separation of church and state as a practical
solution to the, problem put by the American plurality of conflicting religions within one
body politic. However, Catholics do not assent to the deeper theological principles imputed to the no-establishment provision by some separationists, particularity Protestants.
Thus, the Religion Clauses are to be understood as articles of peace, not articles of faith.
MURRAY, supra note 1, at 55-85. For Protestant views of the First Amendment, see Franklin H. Littell, The Basis of Religious Liberty in Christian Belief 6 J. CHURCH & ST. 132
(1964); Niels H. Soe, The Theological Basis of Religious Liberty, 10 ECUMENICAL REv. 40
(1958). A range of perspectives within the Jewish communities is found in AMERICAN JEWS
& THE SEPARATIONIST FAITH: THE NEW DEBATE ON RELIGION IN PUBLIC LIFE (David G.
Dalin ed., 1992).
219 See RESTATEMENT II.A.
220 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
221 Id. at 688.
222 Although the no-endorsement test does not require coercion of conscience, it
does focus on unwanted exposure to religious speech and whether a fair-minded individual would reasonably take offense to the government's expression about a religion that he
or she does not share. Thus, an additional problem with no-endorsement is that heretofore the Court has never recognized a right to be free of exposure to religiously offensive speech. See supra note 59. A government that is careful not to give religious offense
may be acting virtuously, but such is not a First Amendment right. See also County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 668-69 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing no-endorsement test as subjective in application
and thus unworkable in practice); Smith, supra note 131 (same).
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The Free Exercise Clause is normally regarded as the text for
safeguarding religiously informed conscience. A proposal by Justice
Kennedy would collapse the Establishment Clause into the Free
Exercise Clause by having the former protect against coercion of
conscience and very little else." Termed the "coercion test," 4
the proposal accedes to separationism only when it agrees that
government cannot give benefits to religion in such a degree that
"it in fact 'establishes

a

[state]

religion or ... tends to do

so.'" 2z In the later case of Lee v. Weisman,226 striking down public school commencement prayer, Justice Kennedy adopted an expansive notion of coercion of conscience, one that essentially
equates coercion with state endorsement of religion by exposing
school children to unwanted or religiously offensive communication. In quasi-captive audience situations such as commencement
ceremonies, Justice Kennedy's "expanded coercion test" comes very
close to Justice O'Connor's no-endorsement test.2 27 Like no-en-

dorsement, the coercion test weakens separationism by concentrating on the psychological reaction of an "objective observer,"
rather than on policing the boundary between the institutions of
church and state.
The rules set forth in Restatement II.B.1 through II.B.8 are the
Court's most formidable array of requirements born of

223 County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 659 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part).
224 The coercion test had some early support. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Coercion:The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 933 (1986).
225 County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 659 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678
(1984)). Justice Kennedy's coercion test in its entirety reads:
Our cases disclose two limiting principles: government may not coerce anyone to
support or participate in any religion or its exercise; and it may not, in the
guise of avoiding hostility or callous indifference, give direct benefits to religion
in such a degree that it in fact establishes a state religion or religious faith, or
tends to do so. These two principles, while distinct, are not unrelated, for it
would be difficult indeed to establish a religion without some measure of more
or less subtle coercion, be it in the form of taxation to supply the substantial
benefits that would sustain a state-established faith, direct compulsion to observance, or governmental exhortation to religiosity that amounts in fact to proselytizing.
Id. at 659-60 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
226 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (striking down nondenominational prayer at voluntary commencement exercises conducted under auspices of public school).
227 Not only is there a confluence of the no-endorsement test and the expanded
coercion test in the context of a quasi-captive audience, but the principle of religious
choice unhindered by state influence would reach the same result in these cases. See infra
Part IV.D.
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separationism and its two underlying ideas: voluntarism and avoid-

ance of political abuse that is religiously driven. Restatement H.B.1
and II.B.2 protect believers and nonbelievers alike from punishment for blasphemy and from the loss of public benefit for refusal

to profess a religious belief or observe a religious practice. The
most obvious illustration of political abuse occurs in delegations of
legislative power to a church."
In order to give a more concrete definition to the twin alms
of voluntarism and the prevention of political abuse, the Court
has incorporated notions of equality into its rules on
separationism. These notions are evident in four of the Court's
prohibitions: religious classifications that favor some religions over
others;2" classifications that favorably single out particular religious observances;' laws requiring the private sector to unreasonably accommodate religious employees over competing secular
demands;"1 and laws that extend benefits to the religious, but
not to others similarly situated. 2
In Restatement H.B.8, one encounters the Supreme Court's line
of cases most extolled by separationists and most reviled by
nonseparationists. Many of these cases involve governmental aid to
primary and secondary religious schools. Direct aid to church-related schools is prohibited if the purpose of the benefit program or
its effect affords an opportunity for the transmission of inherently
religious beliefs or practices."3 An unvarnished statement of the
Court's rationale is that a religion, to be authentic and full of
vitality, should be ministrated by a voluntary church and that a
religion lacks that integrity if it is paid for from the public treasury. Although a few forms of direct aid (e.g., bussing and secular
textbooks) have been permitted,M most forms of direct aid have
been disallowed because the Court regards parochial schools as
"pervasively sectarian." This perspective is both separationism in its
most virile form and, as discussed below, 5 the sharpest point of
disagreement with a vision of the First Amendment as enhancing
religious choice. However, the Court has said that church-affiliated

228
229
230

See
See
See
231 See
232 See
233 See
234 See
235 See

RESTATEMENT II.B.3.
RESTATEMENT H.B.4.
RESTATEMENT
RESTATEMENT
RESTATEMENT

II.B.5.
lI.B.6.
II.B.7.

RESTATEMENT II.B.8.
cases cited supra note 95.
infia Part IV.D.
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colleges, hospitals, and teenage counseling centers are not necessarily "pervasively sectarian." Thus, it permits most church-related
social service organizations and colleges to receive direct governmental aid.23 6
The Supreme Court has ameliorated separationism by the rule
7
stated in Restatement II.C.3. In cases such as Mueller,2 WittersM

and Zobrest,ns the Court has upheld state aid directed to persons
who, as a matter of individual choice, elect to use their public
2
assistance at a religious school. As developed more fully below, 1
such rulings clearly weaken separationism while enhancing the
notion of the First Amendment's purpose as safeguarding religious
choice.
Perhaps in its most pernicious form, separationism was behind
the Court's doctrine termed "political divisiveness." This test arose
as a subpart of the Court's "excessive entanglement" inquiry-the
third prong of the three-part Lemon test.21

Because the evidence

marshalled to show the divisive nature of challenged legislation
was the private speech of religious individuals, 242 political divisiveness analysis is inimical to the Free Speech Clause.243 Persons,
whether religious or not, have the same free speech right to enter
into public debate over proposed legislation. Simply because some
give voice to their religious convictions in heated debate is not a
reason to conclude that the legislation violates the Establishment
Clause. As a constitutional doctrine, political divisiveness so enshrines the value of civic tolerance as to require the silencing of
religious citizens. This result is ironic, since political divisiveness as
legal doctrine is thereby intolerant of religious expression by religious people. 24 The Court has recognized its error in this regard

236 See RESTATEMENT II.C.2.
237 Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
238 Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
239 Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
240 See infra text following note 275.
241 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-24 (1971).
242 See Clayton ex rel. Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376, 380 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
494 U.S. 1081 (1990): "[T]his approach to constitutional analysis would have the effect of
disenfranchising religious groups when they succeed in influencing secular decisions ....
[r]eligious groups have an absolute right to make their views known and to participate in
public discussion of issues . . . ." (internal quotation and citation omitted).
243 Edward Gaffney, Jr. Political Divisiveness Along Religious Lines: The Entanglement of
the Court in Sloppy History and Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. Louis U. L.J. 205 (1980).
244 Such a result would have the Establishment Clause negating the Free Speech
Clause on the basis of the content of private speech being religious, thereby disenfranchising those with religious convictions concerning the formulation of public policy
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and cabined political divisiveness analysis.2" Justice O'Connor was
the first to see the problem clearly when she said that "the constitutional inquiry should focus ultimately on the character of the
government activity that might cause such divisiveness, not on the
divisiveness itself."2'
C.

ProtectingReligion from the State

The protection 6f organized religion from the state is rooted
in the key idea of institutional autonomy.247 Institutional autonomy
is separationism's second side: the principle that government may
not intervene in the internal affairs of religious organizations. In a
fully mature separationist model, there is more to be done than
just preventing government from improperly helping religion.
Borrowing from the familiar metaphor of Roger Williams, later
used by Thomas Jefferson, the "wall of separation between church
and state" prohibits overreaching from either side of the di248
vide.
Doubtless there is overlap here with separationism's notion of
voluntarism. Whereas institutional autonomy is focused on freedom from governmental interference, voluntarism is concerned
with avoiding governmental involvement even when the
government's purpose is intended to benefit religion. There is no
sharp divide between the two concepts, however; nor is there an

through vigorous public debate. Fidelity to the Court's rule set out in RESTATEMENT IA.2
would not permit this to happen.
245 See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 617 n.14 (1988) (rejecting political divisiveness alone as a basis for invalidating governmental aid program); Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 n.17 (1987)(stating that political divisiveness is
only applicable to parochial aid cases); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 403-04 n.11
(1983) (agreeing that political divisiveness is confined to cases where "direct financial subsidies are paid to parochial schools . . . "). Because political divisiveness analysis continues to confuse lower courts, the Supreme Court should look for an opportunity to expressly bury it as unsustainable under longstanding free speech doctrine.
246 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). See Michael J. Perry, Toward an Ecumenical Politics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 599, 617-18
(1992) (urging prudential restraints but not constitutional prohibitions on politically divisive religious speech).
247 See sources cited supra note 7; see also Frederick M. Gedicks, Toward a Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious Group Rights, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 99 (arguing for less intervention in affairs of churches because they are unique instruments of personal meaning
and community). "Institutional autonomy" is defined supra note 72. See generally Laycock,
supra note 97.
248 HoWE, supra note 202, at 1-10; see ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 217, at 97 (reprinting letter of Roger Williams).
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apparent need for one. Both voluntarism and institutional autonomy are concepts that aim to protect religious freedom.
Conscience alone is inadequate to protect the independence
of religious organizations. Religious organizations need an arena
of operation free from governmental hinderance, regardless of
whether coercion of the collective conscience of the membership
is present.249 This sphere of autonomy, however, has its limits. A
rule that would totally insulate the operations of religious institutions from law would be open to the criticism that it gives insufficient weight to important societal norms enforced by the state.
The most obvious line of cases where the Supreme Court has
protected institutional autonomy is found in those decisions prohibiting detailed judicial inquiries into religious doctrine and the
cases barring civil adjudication of disputes entailing the interpretation of doctrine. 5 ' As mentioned above,25 ' the Court mildly
weakened institutional autonomy in favor of individual conscience
in Jones v. Wolf, 2 which gave states the option of applying a rule
of neutral principles in disputes over ownership of property. Nevertheless, the Court said that the neutral principles approach was
an option only when the civil magistrate does not need to interpret religious doctrine.255 The Court thus clearly acknowledged
that institutional autonomy is the more weighty principle in
intrachurch dispute cases."
The Court's rule permitting government to exempt religious
practices and organizations from regulatory and tax burdens that
apply to all others similarly situated,255 is also born of the idea of
institutional autonomy. Amo 56 is the leading case where the
Court upheld such an exemption. In Amos, the Court exempted

249 See supra note 7. Because the Supreme Court has held that coercion of conscience is required to state a claim under the Free Exercise Clause, see supra note 210,
those who have argued for a fully developed protection of institutional autonomy have
relied on the Establishment Clause as well. See Carl H. Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits
on Governmental Interference with Religious Organizations, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 347
(1984). The concept of voluntarism as one of separationism's two key ideas makes this
plausible. See supra Part IV.B. The alternative is to urge that the Supreme Court abandon
its requirement of coercion as an element of every Free Exercise Clause claim. See
Laycock, supra note 97.
250 See RESTATEMENT I.C.1 and III,.
251 See supra text accompanying notes 184-87.
252 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
253 Id. at 604-05, 608.
254 See RESTATEMENT I.C.2.
255 See RESTATEMENT II.C.1.
256 Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
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religious organizations from federal civil rights legislation prohibiting employment discrimination. Congress recognized the importance of limiting hiring to co-religionists so that a religious organization maintains control over the direction of its ministries and is
faithful to its defining doctrines." In the Court's fully mature
model of separationism, Restatement II.C.1 is the "wall" preventing
the state from overreaching into the precincts of the church.'
The principle of institutional autonomy correlates to the postulate implicit in voluntarism. 9 Namely, if religious belief is genuine, it must be the product of organizations with self-integrity
and vitality."W The parallel principle is that civil government has
no competence to weigh matters of creed, nor is the state
equipped to determine if one system of religious doctrines is more
true than another. Theistic religion necessarily implies a limit on
the authority of the state because sincere religious faith refuses to
recognize the government's sovereignty as ultimate. 6' Theism
posits another sovereignty-a God or gods-that is above, beyond,
and before the state. Since the state's authority is thereby limited,
government is understood to have no jurisdiction over the confessional beliefs that comprise the very core of a religion.
Institutional autonomy frees religious organizations from becoming instruments of state and prevents their ministries from being diverted to the dictates and vagaries of governmental policy.
There are times when government sets out to help religion but,
despite a purity of motive, ends up injuring and debasing the

257 Id. at 335 ("[I~t is a permissible legislative purpose to alleviate significant govermental interference with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out
their religious missions."); id. at 34243 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment); see
generally Laycock, supra note 97.
258 For a few strict separationists (those holding to a one-sided separationism that
acts to restrict the state when it improperly helps religion but not to prohibit government from interfering with religious organizations), the rule in RESTATEMENT ll.C.1 is a
source of irritation. See Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and Religious Institutions: The
Case of Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REV. 391 (1987); William P. Marshall, The
Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
357 (1990); Ellis West, The Case Against a Right to Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 NOTRE DAME
J.L ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 591 (1990).
259 See supra text accompanying notes 200-18.
260 See Giannella, supra note 209, at 517 ("Institutional independence of churches is
thought to guarantee the purity and vigor of their role in society, and the free competition of faiths and ideas is expected to guarantee their excellence and vitality to the benefit of the entire society.") (footnotes omitted).
261 Peter L. Berger, The Serendipity of Liberties, in THE STRUcTURE OF FREEDOM: CORRELATIONS, CAUSES, AND CAUTIONS 1, 15-16 (Richard J. Neuhaus ed., 1991).
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church.262 The institutionally subservient church inevitably is reduced to mere chaplaincy, echoing the political rhetoric of either
the left or the right. Whenever the churches are seen as closely
attached to a particular political party or partisan agenda, they risk
being discredited by the turn of historical events.
The Court's decisions in Alam 63 and Swaggare' doubtlessly weakened the protection of institutional autonomy. So far as the
First Amendment goes, Alamo and Swaggart subject religious organizations to the same regulation and taxation as any business.es
The First Amendment only requires that the state act without
purposeful discrimination. 2' Thus, religious organizations, to remain free from state interference, must appeal to the legislative
and executive branches for exemptions from regulatory and tax
burdens. Such exemptions, although permitted by the Establishment Clause,

are a matter

of legislative

grace. 26

Alamo and

Swaggart, along with the weakening of protection for conscience in
Employment Division v. Smith, ta leave religious organizations with
no recourse but to petition the elected branches for statutory
exemptions.
D. ProtectingReligious Choice from State Influence
Behind the Court's recognition that the legislative and executive branches of government are permitted to confer some benefits on religion as part of a comprehensive social welfare program
is the key idea of religious choice.269 The central premise is that
government should act in a manner that minimally influences the
2
religious choices of its citizensY.
" The desire for greater freedom
262 See supra notes 202-14 and accompanying text.
263 Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985).
264 Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990).
265 See RESTATEMENT I.C (last sentence).
266

See RESTATEMENT I.B.2.

267 See RESTATEMENT II.C.1.
268 494 U.S. 872. See supra text accompanying notes 191-94.
269 Notwithstanding its wide usage, avoidance of the term "accommodation" to describe this key idea is intentional. "Accomodationism" as a legal concept obscures more
than it explains. It suggests that government is making adjustments to account for religious sensibilities as a matter of legislative grace rather than constitutional right. When it
comes to eligibility for education and social welfare benefits, the core value that is being
promoted is equal treatment between religious and secular organizations so that the governmental program does not unduly influence individual religious choices. Because freechoice as a legal right is the centering idea, it makes sense to use the term "religious
choice" rather than the less helpful word "accommodation" to describe the concept. See
RESTATEMENT II.C (introductory sentence) and ll.C.3.
270 When it comes to eligibility for education and social welfare benefits that governHeinOnline -- 70 Notre Dame L. Rev. 638 1994-1995
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of choice is the natural result of individualism and the nation's increased religious pluralism. America has always been religiously
diverse, but religious pluralism is rapidly expanding. Of course,
accelerating pluralism's expansion is not itself the goal or ultimate
value. Rather, the expansion of religious choice as a key idea
facilitates religious freedom.
Proponents of religious choice begin by arguing that the juridical order must change with changed circumstances. Two hundred years ago, when government was small and much of society
was in the private sector, separationism was a plausible ordering of
American society. At that time, the social and educational ministries of religious organizations could be deeply involved in societal
life while still avoiding much contact with government. Accordingly, in the eighteenth century it made sense to say that government
was "neutral" when it left religion alone. Separationism continues
to insist that church and state, each with its own operational
sphere, should remain as uninvolved with one another as possible.
With the arrival of "big government" and the modem welfare/regulatory state, enforcing absolutist separationism would require confining religious schools and social ministries to ever
smaller enclaves of private life. Thus, the argument that a hermetic separation of church and state is "neutral" toward religion is no
longer plausible. If religious social and educational ministries are
to participate with government by operating schools and providing
welfare services, separationist theory demands that religious ministries either secularize their operations or go out of existence.
Either course eliminates choices that would otherwise be available
to religious citizens and thereby diminishes social and religious
pluralism. Governmental noninvolvement with religion is no- longer "neutral" if by neutral one means minimal influence on the
religious choices of individuals.
Separationism's key idea of voluntarism is a freedom from
ment has conferred on similarly situated secular organizations, religious choice advocates
insist that religion be treated with equality, eligible to receive benefits conferred on others. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT II.C.2 and II.C.3. When it comes to religious exemptions from
regulatory burdens imposed on similarity situated secular organizations, religious choice
advocates insist that religion be treated with exceptionalness, relieved of burdens placed
on others. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT II.C.1. Because religious choice proponents argue for
equality when it comes to eligibility for benefits but for exceptionalness when it comes to
avoidance of burdens, to their critics they appear either confused or duplicitous. From
the proponents vantage, however, they are not inconsistent. The common thread in the
religious choice position is keeping the government's influence on religious choices to a
minimum.
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government's involvement in religious concerns, not a freedom for
an expansion of religious choice. Advocates of religious choice
maintain that requiring religious social and educational ministries
to secularize in order to participate in governmental programs on
an equal basis with their secular counterparts is a penalty the
Establishment Clause does not demand.27 I Indeed, proponents of
religious choice argue, although as yet unsuccessfully, that this
denial of equal participation is invidious discrimination and thus a
violation of the religious freedoms guaranteed by the First Amend272
ment.
In any event, religious choice advocates argue that eighteenth
century separationism can continue to be applied to the conditions of the modern world only by clinging to two myths. First,
the modern state has only limited control over societal resources
available for diversion to education and charity. 27 Thus to ask
parochial school parents to pay both tuition to support the parochial schools and taxes to support the government schools is fair.
Second, church-related social services and schools are so "pervasively sectarian" that their inherently religious practices and teachings cannot be separated from the secular aspects of their pro2 4
grams which serve the public goody.
As to the first "myth," religious choice advocates reply that government with its high taxes
has a near monopoly over the resources for charity and education.
This suffocates social and religious diversity by creating a monolithic, state-monopolized structure for the delivery of educational
and welfare services, thus further limiting individual religious
choice. Concerning the second "myth," choice proponents argue
that the idea of subsidiarity permits a juridical distinction between

271 Chopko, supra note 212; McConnell, supra note 109; Gail Merel, The Protection of
Individual Choice: A Consistent Understanding of Religion Under the First Amendment, 45 U.
CHI. L. REv. 805 (1978); Richard J. Neuhaus, A New Order of Religious Freedom, 60 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 620, 628-29 (1992); Neuhaus, supra note 44, at 1-3; see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 246-51, 254-70 (1993) (economic analysis of governmental programs favors religious choice so long as subsidy is distributed to a class of
institutions sufficiently broad to ensure there is little risk of favoring religious institutions
over nonreligious charitable and benevolent recipients).
272 But see Peter K. Rofes, Public Law, Private Schook Choice, the Constitution, and Some
Emerging Issues, 21 J.L. & EDUC. 503 (1992).
273 FREDERICK M. GEDICKS & ROGER HENDRIX, CHOOSING THE DREAM: THE FutrURE OF
RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 168-69 (1991) ("[R]eligion cannot be relatively free in
a country in which government regulates, subsidizes, or taxes virtually every aspect of life
unless affirmative action is taken to create nongovernmental space in which religion ...
can grow and flourish."); see Giannella, supra note 209, at 522-26.
274 See Giannella, supra note 209, at 554-60.
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The principle of religious choice is reflected in the Court's
rule, set out in Restatement II.C.2, permitting direct government
grants to church-related colleges, hospitals, and teenage counseling
centers. By not regarding these auxiliary agencies as being "pervasively sectarian," the Court impliedly subscribes to subsidiarity. At
the level of church-related primary and secondary schools, the
Court has held that subsidiarity is inapplicable.Y Nevertheless,
the Court has upheld state benefits that are paid directly to individuals who in turn may choose to "spend" the benefit at a religious school. 2' Additionally, the Court's allowance of civil rights
laws that require the private sector to reasonably accommodate the
religious practices of employees is yet an additional means of
safeguarding religious choice.278
E. ProtectingReligious Institutions as Counterweights to
State Power and as Sources of Ultimate Meaning
A government that administers public justice among all individuals and institutional structures in society, including the many
different confessional communities, represents the key idea of
structuralpluralism. Primarily developed through the work of scholars in the disciplines of political science, history, sociology, and
religious studies,279 as opposed to the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, the basic principles of structural pluralism are twofold: first,
the mediating institutions in society are a needed buffer between
the growing power of the state and the lone individual;" ° and
second, churches are communities of memory that serve as an
essential framework to explain life's ultimate purpose and meaning.

2

275

81

Bernard J. Coughlin, Toward a Church-State Principlefor Health and Welfare, 11 J.
42-46 (1969).
See RESTATEMENT II.B.8.
See RESTATEMENT II.C.3.
See RESTATEMENT I1.C.5.
See ROCKNE MCCARTHY ET AL., SOCIETY, STATE & SCHOOLS: A CASE FOR STRUCTUR-

CHURCH & ST. 33,

276
277
278
279

AL AND CONFESSIONAL PLURALISM (1980); STEPHEN V. MONSMA, PosmvE NEUTRALITY: LET-

178-209 (1993).
See PETER L. BERGER & RICHARD J. NEUHAUS, To EMPOWER PEOPLE: THE ROLE OF

TING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RING

280

MEDIATING STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC POLICY (1977).

281 See PETER L BERGER, THE SACRED CANOPY. ELEMENTS OF A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
OF RELIGION 26-52 (1967); Mary Ann Glendon, Law, Communities, and the Religious freedom
Language of the Constitution, 60 GEO. WASH. L REv. 672 (1992).
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Structural pluralists envision the state as only one of many
societal structures within the natural order. Families, businesses,
churches, universities, unions, neighborhoods, and other institutional structures exist and should be allowed to flourish in accord
with how they understand their providential calling. Although
government properly has an affirmative role in society, it is limited
because it must not impose a single ideology or theological confession on nongovernmental associations. The state must be animated, not by majoritarian domination, but by the principle of pluralism. The state is not the sole or final authority concerning human
behavior. Individuals acquire rights from, and owe responsibilities
to, institutions other than the state, and the state is bound to
respect the integrity of these diverse nonpolitical communities.
Unlike the key ideas of conscience and institutional autonomy, which seek to contain government, structural pluralists envision an active role for government. They seek to balance the positive contributions of an affirmative state with the positive contributions to human well-being through the nongovernmental sectors.
Structural pluralists argue vigorously for the legal rights of all
groups, not just churches, even when that means lessening some
individual rights so as to protect the autonomy of these mediating
structures. This expansive view of associational rights, they argue,
ultimately enhances individual freedom by challenging liberal political theory which postulates that all rights are held by the individual. Radical individualism leaves the citizenry defenseless in the
face of the all too powerful state. If one is genuinely concerned
about preserving human rights, there is more to fear from a state
whose power is checked only by claims of personal autonomy than
there is to fear from granting associations certain rights. Moreover,
radical individualism is inconsistent with the social nature that we
observe in all humankind. Acknowledging institutional rights, including group rights in the many communities of faith, permits
these nongovernmental societies not only to check the state's power, but also to provide a meaningful context for each person's
exercise of freedom within a community that teaches duty and
responsibility.
Structural pluralists have a heightened awareness of the subtle
influences that occur when the state fails to support all institutions, governmental and nongovernmental, representing the range
of world and life views. Thus, for example, structural pluralists
support equal governmental aid to all schools, thereby enabling
parents to select education from a school that reflects and teaches
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their beliefs or philosophy.282
The Supreme Court's case law, as reflected -in the Restatement,
does not codify structural pluralism as such,s albeit there is language occasionally supportive of churches as mediating institutions."' The key idea of institutional autonomy is consistent with
structural pluralism in so far as the Court protects churches from
state intrusion into their internal affairs, But institutional autonomy cases stop with religious organizations, whereas structural
pluralists would also acknowledge First Amendment rights in families, universities, neighborhoods, and other such associations. Further, structural pluralists would go beyond protection from coercion of conscience and support religious choice when it comes to
state-funded schools and welfare services. Structural pluralists support this result, not because individual religious choice is for them
the ultimate value, but because they value the role of independent
associations within a differentiated society.' Structural pluralism
is most at odds with one-sided separationism.s
The key ideas of conscience, separationism,and institutional autonomy were at their high-water mark at the end of the 1970s. Thereafter, with the decision in Smith concerning conscience, the decisions in Widmar, Mueller, and Bowen bearing on separationism, and

282 See ROCKNE McCARTHY Er AL, DISESTABLISHMENT A SECOND TIME: GENUINE PLURALISM FOR AMERICAN SCHOOLS (1982).
283 Compare Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 575-76 (1984) (summarily rejecting claim by private college to institutional autonomy) with Farrington v. Tokushige, 273
U.S. 284 (1927) (invalidating overbearing state regulation of private, nonsectarian schools).
284 See Howard M. Friedman, Rethinking Free Exercise: Rediscovering Religious Community
and Ritua4 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1800 (1994); Glendon, supra note 281, at 683 nn.5256 (citing examples from cases); Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MICH. L REv. 477 (1991); MONSMA, supra note 279, at 206-09.
285 For example, structural pluralists would note that some confessional communities
do not conceptualize religion as a matter of choice, but more as a "yoke" which conscience has caused them to put on. Religion is powerful precisely because it is not a
choice, but a commanding obligation. See Michael J. Sandel, Freedom of Conscience or Freedom of Choice?, in ARTiCLES OF FAITH, ARTICLES OF PEACE: THE RELIGIOUS LIBERIY CLAUSES
AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 74, 87 (James D. Hunter & Os Guinness eds.,
1990). Still others understand religion as a "binding vision," emphasizing social practices
and identity with a group which enable people to situate themselves within the larger
society. Thus, deeply personal spirituality, faith, and the private conscience as defining
religion are incomplete. See generally MICHAEL PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS,
AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982). Conceptions of religion as duty or as binding community, as
well as all others, argue structural pluralists, should be recognized and protected in the
law.
286 See infra note 258.
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the decisions in Alamo and Swaggart concerning institutional autonomy, the importance of all three principles has receded in the
Court's case law. Trenching into ground previously occupied by
separationism is the key idea of religious choice. Despite the efforts of its proponents, however, religious choice is not protected
as a First Amendment right. Rather, the Supreme Court has held
that the democratically elected branches are permitted, but not
required, by the First Amendment to protect religious choice from
being influenced by educational and social welfare policy. A parallel development is the Court's permitting, but not requiring, the
political branches to adopt statutory religious exemptions to account for concerns of conscience and institutional autonomy.
In summary, the First Amendment story since the late 1970s is
not one of the paradigm of conscience/separationism being supplanted by an equality-based regime. 87 Rather, religious
freedom's modem storyline is of conscience, separationism, and
institutional autonomy being partially eclipsed by the Court's deference to the legislative and executive branches. As a consequence, in many instances the Court has thrown these matters
into the political arena. This is a clarion call to religious citizens,
churches, and other religious organizations to get more involved
in politics, not less-a development of unknown merit bound to
be received with ambivalence in many quarters.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's cases on religious freedom cannot be
captured in a single equation. The forms of religion are too varied and the juridical protection of religious freedom too multidimensional for such a project to succeed. The more promising approach is to compile a slate of case law principles and arrange
them according to those rules that concern government improperly hindering religion and those rules that concern government
improperly helping religion. This approach led to the Restatement of
the Law of Religious Freedom.
As an analytical tool, the Restatement reveals that in reaching
its decisions the Court takes into account several distinctions: (i)
cases involving religious speech versus those not involving speech;
(ii) cases involving private speech versus those involving government speech; (iii) cases involving individuals versus those involving

287

See infra Part III.
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religious organizations; (iv) cases involving the imposition of burdens versus those involving the conferring of benefits; (v) cases
involving challenges to laws where morality and religion overlap
versus those involving laws that are inherently religious; and (vi)
cases where government must treat religion and those similarly
situated with equality versus those where religion may be singled
out for special dispensation. Further, although certain rules focus
on governmental .purpose,2" neither the motive of a legislatore89 nor a law's discriminatory effec 9 ° are relevant.
No single, unifying vision of First Amendment religious freedom can adequately account for the various rules found in, the
Restatement. Rather, the Supreme Court has applied an assemblage
of key ideas encapsuled in the words conscience, separationism,
institutional autonomy, and religious choice. On occasion these
four principles are complimentary as they pursue the agreed-upon
goal of religious freedom, albeit not out of the same underlying
rationale. At other times they conflict, resulting in disharmony and
sharp division within the Court.
None of these key ideas is "neutral" as to either religion or
political philosophy. Within the interstices of each idea is a variant
on a vision of the Good Society. Each responds differently to the
question poised at the outset of this article: How is a religiously
diverse people to live together, despite our deepest differences,
under a common civil polity? It is unlikely that a final answer,
good for all time, will be forthcoming. Rather, we can expect a
continuing dialogue that only incrementally responds to the foregoing question, just enough to move beyond the issue of the moment. Given these two complex institutions, church and state, that
the conversation will be perpetually ongoing is probably inevitable.
The law of church and state may never come to a resting place
that will not provoke a new rejoinder. Yet it is possible to discern
some order in this multiplicity, to halt the conversation, as it were,
and lay down some markers where the Court's center has held to
a consistent path. The Restatement, hopefully, fulfills that modest
task.

288
289
290

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT I.B.2, II.B.4, and II.C.4.
See supra note 67.
See RESTATEMENT I.B.2; supra note 88.
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Appendix
Restatement of the Law of Religious Freedom
1. When Government May Not Hinder Religion
A. The Free Speech Clause protects the expression of an
individual or religious organization from governmental
restrictions as follows:
1. Individuals and religious organizations cannot by
word or symbolic act be forced to profess a belief
contrary to their religion.
2. An individual or a religious organization is entitled to
protection of religious expression to the same extent
as nonreligious expression, such as political, artistic,
or educational speech. The Free Exercise Clause
grants no more than equal rights to religious expression, and the Free Speech Clause requires no less.
Governmental expression is treated differently than
speech by a private individual or a religious organization,
for the focus shifts to one of government helping religion.
B. The Free Exercise Clause protects an individual's religious belief or practice from governmental restrictions as
follows:
1. Government cannot place an individual in the position of having to prove the truth of his or her religious beliefs, but sincerity is required when invoking
protection.
2. Government cannot enforce a restriction that purposefully discriminates against religion, religious
practice, or against an individual because of his or
her religion. However, a restriction's discriminatory
effect is not, without more, unconstitutional. Even in
the face of purposeful discrimination, government
may proceed to enforce a restriction upon proof that
it furthers a compelling state interest that cannot be
achieved by means less restrictive to the religious
practice.
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C.

The Religion Clauses protect a religious belief or practice
of a religious organization from governmental restrictions
as follows:
1. A religious organization is protected from restrictions
that invade its institutional autonomy. Restrictions
that generate a detailed inquiry into religious doctrine
or that entail a civil resolution of a dispute over
doctrine violate an organization's institutional autonomy.
2.

Concerning litigation over the ownership of church
property, states have the option of following either
the rule of judicial deference or of neutral principles
of law, so long as the prohibitions in Restatement
LC.1 are followed.

Apart from the prohibitions in Restatement I, the Religion
Clauses are not violated by the regulation or taxation of
religious organizations, so long as similarly situated nonreligious organizations are subject to the same law.
I1. When Government May Not Help Religion
A.

Concerning governmental expression, government may
neither confess inherently religious beliefs nor advocate
that individuals profess inherently religious beliefs or that
individuals observe such practices. Government may
acknowledge the role of religion in society and teach
about its contributions to, for example, history, literature,
music, and the visual arts. But the Establishment Clause
is violated when the expression places government's imprimatur on a religion or on an inherently religious belief
or practice.
B. Concerning governmental action that is not expressional,
the Free Speech and Establishment Clauses are violated
as follows:
1. Government cannot penalize "blasphemy," the
"sacrilegious," or other activity that does no more
than speak ill of a religion.
2. Government cannot compel an individual, upon pain
of material penalty, inconvenience, or loss of public
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benefit or advantage, to profess a religious belief or
to observe an inherently religious practice.
3.

Government cannot delegate civil authority to a religious organization.

4.

Government cannot purposefully discriminate among
religions, nor utilize classifications based on denominational or sectarian affiliation to extend benefits or
to impose burdens.

5.

Government cannot utilize classifications that single
out a religious practice (as opposed to language
inclusive of a general category of religious observances) thereby favoring that particular practice.

6.

Government cannot regulate the private business
sector so as to purposefully and unreasonably favor
religious observance over competing secular interests.

7.

Government cannot confer a benefit on religion if the
benefit is not available to others similarly situated.

8.

Government cannot confer a benefit directly on religious organizations where the benefit, facially or as
applied, affords an opportunity for the transmission
of inherently religious beliefs or practices; this is so
even though the benefit may be available to others
similarly situated.

C. Governmental actions not prohibited in Restatement I,
II.A, and I1.B are left to the judgment of legislatures and
public officials. Accordingly, without violating the Establishment Clause government may enforce a law as follows:
1. Government may refrain from imposing a burden on
religion, even though the burden is imposed on others similarly situated.
2.

Government may directly confer a benefit on religious organizations if the benefit is available to others similarly situated and if the object of the benefit,
facially or as applied, does not afford an opportunity
for the transmission of inherently religious beliefs or
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practices.
3.

Government may confer a benefit on individuals,
who exercise personal choice in the use of their
benefit at similarly situated institutions, whether public, private nonsectarian, or religious, even if the
benefit indirectly advances religion.

4.

Government may purposefully benefit only governmental agencies, thereby excluding similarly situated
private organizations, whether nonsectarian or religious. However, a law that benefits all similarly situated groups, public and private, but purposefully excludes religious organizations, is prima facie violative
of the Free Exercise Clause.

5.

Subject to the prohibitions in Restatement I and il,
government may protect individuals and religious
organizations against discrimination on the basis of
religi6n in, for example, employment, public accommodations, housing, other property holdings and
contracts, the commission of hate crimes, and the
exercise of free speech.

Ill. "Religion" and the First Amendment: Definition and Application
A. A religious belief or practice need not be "central" to a
claimant's religion. A claimant may disagree with co-religionists, be unsure or wavering, or be a recent convert.
A claimant need not be a member of an organized religious denomination, community, or sect. However, a
claimant must be sincere.
B. The Establishment Clause is not violated when a governmental restriction (or social program) merely reflects a
moral judgment, shared by some religions, about conduct
thought harmful (or beneficial) to society. The Establishment Clause is violated only when such a law violates
one of the rules set out in Restatement II.A or II.B.
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Only beliefs and practices with a basis in religion are
protected by the Free Exercise Clause. To avoid omitting
from protection unfamiliar and emerging religions, thereby
discriminating among religions, the definition of religion
remains broad and indeterminate, including naturalistic,
nontheistic, and anthropocentric religions. The definition
excludes a purely personal and philosophical way of life.
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